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of such attacks on optimal detection systems by mathematical analysis and simulation.
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Deviation from legitimate protocol operation in wireless networks has received con-
siderable attention from the research community in recent years. The pervasive nature
of wireless networks with devices that are gradually becoming essential components in
our everyday life justifies the rising interest on that issue. In addition, the architectural
organization of wireless networks in distributed secluded user communities raises issues of
compliance with protocol rules. More often than not, users are clustered in communities
that are defined on the basis of proximity, common service or some other common inter-
est. Since such communities are bound to operate without a central supervising entity, no
notion of trust can be presupposed.
Furthermore, the increased level of sophistication in the design of protocol com-
ponents, together with the requirement for flexible and readily reconfigurable protocols
has led to the extreme where wireless network adapters and devices have become easily
programmable. As a result, it is feasible for a network peer to tamper with software and
firmware, modify its wireless interface and network parameters and ultimately abuse the
protocol. This situation is referred to as protocol misbehavior. The goals of a misbehav-
ing peer range from exploitation of available network resources for its own benefit up to
network disruption. The solution to the problem is the timely and reliable detection of
such misbehavior instances, which would eventually lead to network defense and response
mechanisms and isolation of the misbehaving peer. However, two difficulties arise: the
random nature of some protocols (such as the IEEE 802.11 medium access control one)
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and the nature of the wireless medium with its inherent volatility. Therefore, it is not
easy to distinguish between a peer misbehavior and an occasional protocol malfunction
due to a wireless link impairment. An additional difficulty specific for the wireless en-
vironment arises when observations of protocol participants are hindered by interference
due to concurrent transmissions. As a consequence, a detector may miss one or more
control messages sent by the attacker, which delays the detection process due to the fact
that a detector registers erroneous observation sequence. In the less severe case, when the
perceived and actual interference levels are similar, the detector is aware of existence of
discrepancies between the measured and actual behavior of monitored peers and either
adjusts its detection strategy or notifies the rest of the network that it is unable to reach
a reliable decision. In the more severe case when the perceived interference level is sig-
nificantly lower than the actual one, an increase in false negatives is observed, i.e. the
number of missed detections increases.
Further challenges arise in the presence of multiple collaborating adversaries. We
assume that colluding participants collaborate by exchanging information and by taking
actions that amplify each other’s effects on network functionality. Furthermore, such col-
laborative attacks employ “intelligence”, that is, observe actions of detectors and defenders
and adjust the timing or the stages or the actions of the adversaries. Understanding the
performance of the collaborating adversaries versus the collaborating detectors and de-
fenders is a key issue that involves several fundamental challenges that include modeling
of optimal adversarial strategies, optimal detection, timely localization etc.
It is reasonable to assume that an intelligent adversary does not focus his activities
at the origin of the attack only, but attempts to disrupt the network functionality on a
larger scale by employing strategies that result in both horizontal and vertical propagation
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of misbehavior. As a consequence, a detection system that resides in a single network layer
may not be sufficient for detection of more sophisticated attacks strategies.
It is important to mention that due to the unpredictability of wireless protocols
and the medium itself, it is impossible to completely predict adversarial behavior. More
specifically, as it will be demonstrated in this thesis, such approach is undesirable and
leads to construction of an IDS that is capable of detecting only a narrow class of attacks.
For that specific class of attacks the given IDS exhibits superior detection rate, but when
the adversarial strategy slightly deviates from the original one, the detection rate quickly
falls below an acceptable threshold. In this thesis we aim to provide general performance
bounds for the worst-case attack scenarios in wireless networks for the case of a single
intelligent adversary in the environment with and without interference and colluding ad-
versaries. We adopt the game-theoretic approach for modeling such behaviors and extend
our analysis by introducing the notion of minimum cross-entropy. The provided scenarios
represent the worst-case performance bounds of the detection system.
1.1 Our contributions
In the first part of the thesis, we address the problem of MAC protocol misbehavior
detection at a fundamental level and cast it as a min-max robust detection problem. We
perform our analysis by assuming the presence of an intelligent adaptive adversary. Our
work contributes to the current literature by: (i) formulating the misbehavior problem as
a min-max robust sequential detection problem that encompasses the case of an intelli-
gent attacker, (ii) quantifying performance losses incurred by an attack and defining an
uncertainty class such that the focus is only on attacks that incur “large enough” perfor-
mance losses, therefore avoiding the trap of wasting system resources on detection and
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notification of minor short-term disruptions in the network that may or may not be of ad-
versarial nature, (iii) obtaining an analytical expression for the worst-case attack and the
number of observations required for detection, (iv) establishing an upper bound on num-
ber of required samples for detection of any of the attacks of interest, therefore providing
the worst-case performance evaluation of the given detection system, (v) extending the
basic model to scenarios with interference due to concurrent transmissions and obtaining
performance bounds of both the adversary and the detection systems in such settings.
We implement the derived optimal class of attacks in the network simulator OPNET [1]
and compare the performance of such attacks against optimal and sub-optimal detection
schemes. Furthermore, we extend the proposed framework by formulating the problem
of optimal detection against misbehavior of intelligent colluding attackers in the IEEE
802.11 MAC and obtain an upper bound on number of required samples for detection of
such attacks. In addition to that, we perform detailed evaluation of collaborative attacks
and quantify their performance by comparing their effects on the system with the effects
of a single attacker of identical strength and emphasize the importance of localization in
timely detection of such attacks.
The different layers in the network stack communicate with each other, enabling
the propagation of misbehavior instances between layers. Thus, misbehavior that takes
place at the MAC layer can significantly affect the routing process as well. The current
literature only considers brute force attacks, such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in
the MAC layer and their impact on the Network Layer. In this thesis we investigate the
effects of the worst-case attacks that originate in the MAC layer on two routing protocols.
We show by analysis and simulation that vertical propagation of misbehavior gives rise
to new threats, such as false accusation of legitimate nodes by the IDS located in the
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network layer. Additionally, the distributed nature of the wireless ad hoc networks as well
as the randomness of the employed protocols, makes the task of detection and localization
of malicious participants extremely challenging.
Finally, we apply the principle of minimum cross-entropy and derive a general frame-
work for construction of optimal attacks in the IEEE 802.11 MAC.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses existing work in the areas of
the IEEE 802.11 MAC misbehavior detection and cross-layer propagation and detection
of such attacks. Chapter 3 presents a brief overview of the IEEE 802.11 MAC DCF and
analyzes its potential vulnerabilities (i) in regular settings and (ii) in the presence of
interference. In Chapter 4 we formally define our problem of misbehavior detection and
place it into a min-max robust framework. We define performance bounds of an intelligent
adaptive attacker and the quickest IDS using game-theoretic approach and perform both
analytical and experimental evaluation in various settings. In Chapter 5, we extend the
proposed framework to the case of colluding adversaries and obtain the expression for the
worst-case attack for the case of n ≥ 2 collaborating adversaries. We analyze the impact
of collaborating adversaries on the performance of the system and compare the effects to
the one obtained by a single attacker of the same strength in terms of detection delay.
In Chapter 6 we continue the analysis from Chapter 4 by providing a detailed analysis of
impact of interference on the performance of quickest detection schemes. In Chapter 7 we
apply the method of cross-entropy minimization to the problem of worst-case attacks in
the IEEE 802.11 MAC. Finally, in Chapter 8 we analyze the impact of the worst-case MAC
layer attacks on the performance of two Network Layer protocols and propose an efficient
5





Protocol misbehavior has been studied in various scenarios in different communica-
tion layers and under several mathematical frameworks. To our knowledge, there exists
no unique adversarial model that can be used for evaluation of existing IDSs. The lack of
such models that capture a wide class of misbehavior strategies (with brute force strategy
being the extreme instance of misbehavior) represents a major problem for evaluation and
performance comparison of existing detection schemes. In addition to that, the absence of
such models makes a fair performance comparison of existing schemes almost impossible
due to the fact that each detection scheme is constructed for detection of a specific class
of adversarial strategies. As an illustration of this point we observe two detection systems
IDS1 with detection strategy D1 and IDS2 with detection strategy D2 which were con-
structed for detection of adversarial strategies A1 and A2 respectively. We claim that due
to the fact that each detection system was constructed for detection of a specific class of
attacks, IDS1 will exhibit superior performance in detecting adversarial strategy A1. On
the other hand, it will exhibit sub-optimal performance for detection of an attack that
belongs to a class A2. The same will hold for IDS2. This claim will be illustrated by
detailed experimental analysis in Chapter 4.
2.1 MAC layer misbehavior detection
The authors in [2] focus on MAC layer misbehavior in wireless hot-spot communities.
They propose a sequence of conditions on available observations for testing the extent to
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which MAC protocol parameters have been manipulated. The advantage of the scheme
is its simplicity and easiness of implementation, although in some cases the method can
be deceived by cheating peers, as the authors point out. A different line of thought is
followed by the authors in [3], where a modification to the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol
is proposed to facilitate the detection of selfish and misbehaving nodes. The approach
presupposes a trustworthy receiver, since the latter assigns to the sender the back-off
value to be used. The receiver can readily detect potential misbehavior of the sender and
accordingly penalize it by providing less favorable access conditions through higher back-
off values for subsequent transmissions. A decision about protocol deviation is reached
if the observed number of idle slots of the sender is smaller than a pre-specified fraction
of the allocated back-off. The sender is labeled as misbehaving if it turns out to deviate
continuously based on a cumulative metric over a sliding window. This work also presents
techniques for handling potential false positives due to the hidden terminal problem and
the different channel quality perceived by the sender and the receiver. The work in [4]
attempts to prevent scenarios of colluding sender-receiver pairs by ensuring randomness
in the course of MAC protocol.
A game-theoretic framework for the same problem at the MAC layer is provided
in [5]. Using a dynamic game model, the authors derive the strategy that each node
should follow in terms of controlling channel access probability by adjustment of contention
window, so that the network reaches its equilibrium. They also provide conditions under
which the Nash equilibrium of the network with several misbehaving nodes is Pareto
optimal for each node as well. The underlying assumption is that all nodes are within
wireless range of each other so as to avoid the hidden terminal problem.
Node misbehavior can be viewed as a special case of denial-of-service (DoS) attack or
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equivalently a DoS attack can be considered as an extreme instance of misbehavior. DoS
attacks at the MAC layer are a significant threat to availability of network services. This
threat is intensified in the presence of the open wireless medium. In [6], the authors study
simple DoS attacks at the MAC layer, show their dependence on attacker traffic patterns
and deduce that the use of MAC layer fairness can mitigate the effect of such attacks.
In [7] the authors focus on DoS attacks against the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol. They
describe vulnerabilities of the protocol and show ways of exploiting them by tampering
with normal operation of device firmware.
As it can be seen from the above analysis, mostly brute force and DoS attacks are
considered in current literature. Such approaches exclude existence of intelligent adaptive
adversary that has the ability to change his behavior depending on the type of the deployed
IDS and the current environment (i.e. number of competing nodes, interference levels,
etc.). In this work we adopt the notion of an intelligent adaptive adversary and evaluate his
impact on optimal IDS. By adopting a general adversarial model we (i) derive performance
bounds of the adversary, (ii) derive performance bounds of the IDS (i.e. evaluate the best
and worst-case scenarios with respect to the detection delay) and (iii) enable comparison
of several existing adversarial strategies and detection systems by placing them in our
framework.
Misbehavior detection has been studied at the network layer for routing protocols
as well. The work in [8] presents the watchdog mechanism, which detects nodes that do
not forward packets destined for other nodes. The pathrater mechanism evaluates the
paths in terms of trustworthiness and helps in avoiding paths with untrusted nodes. The
technique presented in [9] aims at detecting malicious nodes by means of neighborhood
behavior monitoring and reporting from other nodes. A trust manager, a reputation
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manager and a path manager aid in information circulation throughput the network,
evaluation of appropriateness of paths and establishment of routes that avoid misbehaving
nodes. Detection, isolation and penalization of misbehaving nodes are also attained by
the technique above.
2.2 Cross-layer misbehavior detection
Various IDS techniques, mostly based on misuse and anomaly detection principles,
have been proposed for attack detection and prevention. Most of the existing intrusion
detection approaches focus on attack detection and response at a particular layer of the
protocol stack, mostly the network layer. The effects of the various attacks launched in
one layer on the performance of another layer have not been widely investigated. The
authors in [10] present a cautionary perspective on cross-layer design. They emphasize
the importance of the approach and discuss the architectural problems that cross-layer
design, if done without care, can create. In [11], the authors define the notion of cross-layer
design and state three main reasons for using it in the wireless environment: (i) the unique
problems created by the wireless links; (ii) the possibility of opportunistic communication
on wireless links and (iii) the new modalities of communication offered by the wireless
medium. In addition to that, they classify cross-layer design proposals and present pro-
posals for implementing cross-layer interactions. The field of intrusion detection has not
appropriately addressed the importance of cross-layer design and its benefits in attack de-
tection and prevention. In [12] the authors use a cross-layer based IDS system to analyze
the anomalies in the network. They introduce the concept of integrating multiple layers
of the protocol stack for more efficient intrusion detection. In [13] the authors study the
interaction of the routing and MAC layer protocols under different mobility parameters.
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They simulate interaction between three MAC protocols (MACA, 802.11 and CSMA) and
three routing protocols (AODV, DSR and LAR scheme) and perform statistical analysis
in order to characterize the interaction between layers in terms of latency, throughput,
number of packets received and long term fairness. In [14] the authors quantify the impact
of link-layer misbehavior on the performance of two routing protocols, DSR and AODV.
They investigate two brute force attacks in the link layer: constant RTS/CTS packet
dropping and back-off manipulation and prove by simulation that each of the above at-
tacks propagates to the network layer, affecting the overall network performance. In [15],
the authors aim to develop a cross-layer detection framework that detects and localizes
malicious participants in various layers of the network. They consider only brute force
attacks, such as DoS attack in the MAC layer and packet dropping in the network layer.
11
Chapter 3
IEEE 802.11 MAC DCF
3.1 Overview of the protocol
The most frequently used MAC protocol for wireless networks is the IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol, which uses a distributed contention resolution mechanism for sharing the
wireless channel. Its design attempts to ensure a relatively fair access to the medium for
all participants of the protocol. In order to avoid collisions, the nodes follow a binary
exponential back-off scheme that favors the last winner amongst the contending nodes.
In Distributed Coordinating Function (DCF) of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol,
coordination of channel access for contending nodes is achieved with Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) [16]. A node with a packet to transmit
selects a random back-off value b uniformly from the set {0, 1, . . . , W − 1}, where W is
the (fixed) size of the contention window. The back-off counter decreases by one at each
time slot that is sensed to be idle and the node transmits after b idle slots. In case the
channel is perceived to be busy in one slot, the back-off counter stops momentarily. After
the back-off counter is decreased to zero, the transmitter can reserve the channel for the
duration of data transfer. First, it sends a request-to-send (RTS) packet to the receiver,
which responds with a clear-to-send (CTS) packet. Thus, the channel is reserved for
the transmission. Both RTS and CTS messages contain the intended duration of data
transmission in the duration field. Other hosts overhearing either the RTS or the CTS
are required to adjust their Network Allocation Vector (NAV) that indicates the duration
for which they will defer transmission. This duration includes the SIFS intervals, data
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packets and acknowledgment frame following the transmitted data frame. An unsuccessful
transmission instance due to collision or interference is denoted by lack of CTS or ACK
for the data sent and causes the value of contention window to double. If the transmission
is successful, the host resets its contention window to the minimum value W .

















Figure 3.1: Nodes A and C contend for accessing node B. In the first attempt A reserves
the channel followed by successful access by node C.
Typical parameter values for the MAC protocol depend on the physical layer that
IEEE 802.11 uses. Table 3.1 shows the parameters used when the physical layer is using
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS).
3.2 IEEE 802.11 MAC Misbehavior
As it has been seen in Sect. 3.1, the IEEE 802.11 DCF favors the node that selects
the smallest back-off value among a set of contending nodes. Therefore, a malicious or
selfish node may choose not to comply to protocol rules by occasionally or constantly
selecting small back-off values, thereby gaining significant advantage in channel sharing
over regularly behaving, honest nodes. Moreover, due to the exponential increase of the
contention window after each unsuccessful transmission, non-malicious nodes are forced to








DATA MAC header (30b)+DATA(0-2312b)+FCS(4b)
Timeouts 300-350µs
CWmin 32 time slots
CWmax 1024 time slots
Table 3.1: Parameters for DSSS
their chances of accessing the channel decrease even further. Apart from intentional selec-
tion of small back-off values, a node can deviate from the MAC protocol in other ways as
well. He can (i) choose a smaller size of contention window; (ii) wait for shorter interval
than DIFS or (iii) reserve the channel for larger interval than the maximum allowed NAV
duration. In this work, we adhere to protocol deviations that occur due to manipulation
of the back-off values.
The nodes that are instructed by the protocol to defer transmission are able to
overhear transmissions from nodes whose transmission range they reside in. Therefore,
silenced nodes can observe the behavior of transmitting nodes. The question that arises is
whether there exists a way to take advantage of this observation capability and use it to
identify potential misbehavior instances. If observations indicate a misbehavior event, the

















Figure 3.2: Observer nodes and effect of interference due to concurrent transmissions.
a response action in order to isolate the misbehaving nodes. Detecting misbehavior is
not straightforward even in the simplest case, namely that of unobstructed observations.
The difficulty stems primarily from the non-deterministic nature of the access protocol
that does not lead to a straightforward way of distinguishing between a legitimate sender,
that happens to select small back-offs, and a misbehaving node that maliciously selects
small back-offs. The open wireless medium and the different perceived channel conditions
at different locations add to the difficulty of the problem. Additional challenges arise in
the presence of interference due to ongoing concurrent transmissions. Fig. 3.2 depicts a
scenario where node A or B is malicious. At this stage, we assume that A is the only
misbehaving node and that no other node in its vicinity transmits. We assume that nodes
have clocks that are synchronized through the use of GPS devices. Additional issues arising
from errors in clock synchronization are not investigated in this work. Node A accesses
the channel by using a randomly selected back-off value within its contention window.
When the back-off counter decreases to zero, A sends an RTS to B, which replies with a
CTS. Node A’s RTS message silences nodes 1 to 7, which are in A’s transmission radius.
Similarly, node B’s CTS silences nodes 4 to 10. Following the RTS-CTS handshake, A
sends a data segment to B. After the transmission is over, A attempts to access the channel
anew by selecting a back-off value again and the procedure repeats. Nodes 1-10 can hear
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the transmissions of nodes A or B, or of both, depending on whose transmission radius
they reside in. Consider the i-th transmission of node A. A node in its transmission range
finds time point ti of RTS packet reception from
ti = Ti−1 + TDIFS + bi, i > 1, (3.1)
where Ti−1 denotes the end time point of reception of the previous data segment and bi is
the random back-off value. Thus, the back-off values can be easily derived. Note that the
back-off value before transmission of the first data segment cannot be found since there
does not exist any previous reference point to compare it to. A node within transmission
range of B can also compute the back-off used by A by using as a reference the time point
of reception of the overheard ACK from node B for the previous data segment. Then, a
node can measure time point t′i of CTS packet reception and compute the back-off of node
A by using
t′i = TACK,i−1 + TDIFS + bi + TRTS + TSIFS, i > 1. (3.2)
Similarly with the RTS, the first back-off value cannot be found. Clearly, the entire
sequence of back-offs of node A is observable in this fashion. It should also be noted that
the identity of the node who uses those back-offs (which could be potentially a misbehaving
one) is revealed in the corresponding fields of RTS or CTS messages.
3.3 Impact of interference on misbehavior detection schemes
Up to this point, we have assumed that both the attacker and the detector observe
each back-off value and that no errors are present. However, the main characteristic of
the wireless medium is its unpredictability and instability. Namely, it is not realistic to
assume that both the attacker and the detector will always obtain a perfect sequence of
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back-off values. It is reasonable to assume that due to interference both the adversary
and the IDS will obtain a mixture of correct and erroneous observations at certain points
of time. A detailed analysis of such scenarios and their impact on the performance of
optimal attackers and detection schemes will be provided in Chapter 6.
In order to provide an insight into impact of interference on the performance of
the IEEE 802.11 MAC participants, we now describe two scenarios in which observations
of nodes 1-3 and 8-9 from Fig. 3.2 are hindered by interference and hence correctness of
observations is influenced.
3.3.1 Interference due to concurrent transmissions
Assume that node C has obtained access to the channel and therefore node 2 is
silenced. Node C is in the process of transmitting data packets to node D. If observer
node 2 is within transmission range of C, C’s transmission is overheard by node 2. Clearly,
the ongoing transmission of C is experienced as interference at node 2 and obstructs node
2’s observations. In case of significant interference level, node 2 may not be able to
obtain the timing of received RTS of node A and find the back-off value. Additional
ongoing transmissions increase the perceived interference level. Evidently, obstructed
measurements due to interference create additional problems in detecting misbehavior, as
will be seen in the sequel. The extent to which observations of node 2 are influenced by
interference depends on the relative proximity of 2 to node A and to the interfering nodes,
since the received signal strength of the RTS packet and the interference is a function of
signal strength decay with distance.
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3.3.2 Interference due to simultaneous channel access
Node 2 that is silenced by A’s RTS observes the sequence of back-offs of node A. If
node 2 is in the interference range of node C and C is out of the interference range of A,
C may attempt to access the channel at the same time. If the RTS packets from nodes
A and C overlap in time when received at node 2, node 2 receives a garbled packet and
cannot distinguish neither the transmitter identity nor the packet reception time.
Interference from concurrent data transmissions and simultaneous channel access
also affects measurements of nodes within the transmission range of node B. Both types
of impairments lead to difficulties in misbehavior detection because they cause corruption
of measurements. The probability of the second type of impairment is admittedly much
lower than that of the first type, since it requires that nodes A and C access the channel
almost at the same time. Although this problem is different from the first one, we will
elaborate on obstruction of observations owing only to the first scenario.
A comment about the effect of misbehavior in a network-wide scale is in place here.
Each node within transmission range of a malicious node increases its contention window
exponentially after each unsuccessful transmission attempt. The same holds for nodes
which are located out of the transmitter’s range but are able to transmit to nodes that are
silenced by the transmitter (in our case, nodes C and E). They may constantly attempt
to communicate with silenced nodes and consequently increase their contention windows.
In that respect, the effect of a malicious node spreads in an area much larger than their
transmission range and may affect channel access of nodes throughout that area.
Another arising issue is the notification of the rest of the network about the mis-
behavior. Although all nodes within transmission range of nodes A and B above can
deduce potential misbehavior, the nature of IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol prohibits them
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from obtaining access to the channel and transmitting notification information.
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Chapter 4
Min-max robust misbehavior detection
4.1 Introduction
As it has been seen in Chapter 3, a malicious or selfish node may choose not to
comply to protocol rules by occasionally or constantly selecting small back-off values. As
a consequence of this modified access policy, such node may gain significant advantage
in channel sharing over honest nodes that comply to the protocol rules. An additional
obstacle in such settings arises due to the exponential increase of the contention window
after each unsuccessful transmission, which decreases the chances of channel access by
legitimate protocol participants.
Several frameworks for attack detection and preventions have been proposed in
recent years. However, as it has been pointed out in Chapter 2, none of the proposed
approaches considers intelligent adaptive attackers. More specifically, all known detection
schemes are constructed for detection and prevention of either brute force or sub-optimal
attacks that are focused against a specific detection scheme in a specific adversarial setting.
If we assume that a specific attack strategy AS1 was constructed against a detection
algorithm D1 deployed by an intrusion detection system IDS1, then the same attack
strategy becomes sub-optimal once a new detection algorithm D2 is deployed. This results
in quicker and in most cases instantaneous detection of attacks.
In this work we present a general framework for detection and prevention of intel-
ligent adaptive adversaries. More specifically, we address the problem of MAC protocol
misbehavior detection at a fundamental level and cast it as a min-max robust detection
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problem, therefore capturing both the goal of the detection system (minimize detection
delay) and the goal of the attacker (maximize gain). The main contributions of this work
are: (i) formulation of the misbehavior problem as a min-max robust sequential detection
problem that encompasses the case of a sophisticated attacker, (ii) quantification of perfor-
mance losses incurred by an attack and definition of an uncertainty class that focuses only
on attacks that incur “large enough” performance losses, (iii) derivation of an analytical
expression for the worst-case attack and the number of observations required for attack
detection, (iv) establishment of an upper bound on number of required samples needed
for detection of any of the attacks of interest.
4.2 Problem motivation and sequential detection
At this point we revisit the setup presented in Fig. 3.2 and focus on monitoring
the behavior of node A for the single-hop communication with node B. We assume
that any node within the transmission range of A or B observes the same sequence of
measurements of back-off values used by A. Since the sequence of observations is the
same, the procedure that will be described in the sequel can take place in any of the
observer nodes. Since the back-off measurements are enhanced by an additional sample
each time A attempts to access the channel, an on-line sequential scheme is suitable for
the nature of the problem. The basis of such a scheme is a sequential detection test that
is implemented at an observer node. The objective of the detection test is to derive a
decision as to whether or not a misbehavior occurs as fast as possible, namely with the
least possible number of observation samples. Since the observation samples are random
variables, the number of required samples for taking a decision is a random variable as
well.
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A sequential detection test is a procedure which with every new information that
arrives asks the question whether it should stop receiving more samples or continue sam-
pling. If the answer to the first question is to stop (because sufficient information has
been accumulated) then it proceeds to the phase of making a decision on the nature of the
data. It is therefore clear that there are two quantities involved: a stopping time (s.t.) N
which is a random variable taking positive integer values and denoting the time we decide
to stop getting more data; and a decision rule dN which at the time of stopping N decides
between the two hypotheses H0,H1 and therefore assumes the values 0,1. For simplicity,
let us denote with D the combination D = (N, dN ) of the s.t. N and the decision rule dN .
The probability of false alarm and the probability of missed detection constitute
inherent tradeoffs in a detection scheme. Clearly, we can obtain small values for both of
these two decision error probabilities by accumulating more information, that is, at the
expense of larger detection delay. A logical compromise would therefore be to prescribe
some maximal allowable values for the two error probabilities, and attempt to minimize
the expected detection delay. Expressing this problem under a more formal setting, we




E1[N ], under the constraints P0[dN = 1] ≤ α; P1[dN = 0] ≤ β; (4.1)
where Pi, Ei denote probability and expectation under hypothesis Hi, i = 0, 1, and 0 <
α, β < 1 are the prescribed values for the probability of false alarm and miss respectively.
This mathematical setup was first proposed by Wald in [17], where he also introduced
the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) for its solution. The SPRT test is defined
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in terms of the log-likelihood ratio Sn
Sn = ln
f1(x1, . . . , xn)
f0(x1, . . . , xn)
, (4.2)
of the two joint probability density functions fi(x1, . . . , xn) of the data {x1, . . . , xn} under
hypothesis Hi, i = 0, 1. The corresponding s.t. N and decision rule dN are then given by
N = inf
n





1 if SN ≥ B
0 if SN ≤ A,
(4.4)
where thresholds A < 0 < B depend on the specified values of PFA and PM . From Wald’s
identity [17]
E[SN ] = E[N ]× E[Λ] (4.5)
where E[Λ] is the expected value of the logarithm of the likelihood ratio. By using a
similar approach as the one in [18, pp.339-340], we can derive the following inequalities
1− PM ≥ eaPFA and PM ≤ eb(1− PFA), (4.6)
where a and b are the thresholds of SPRT. When the average number of required obser-
vations is very large, the increments Λj in the logarithm of the likelihood ratio are also
small. Therefore, when the test terminates with selection of hypothesis H1, SN will be
slightly larger than a, while when it terminates with selection of H0, SN will be very close
to b. Therefore, the above inequalities hold to a good approximation as equalities. Under
this assumption, the decision levels a and b that are required for attaining performance




and b = ln
PM
1− PFA . (4.7)
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Following the derivations of [17, 18],
E[SN ] = aPD + b(1− PD) (4.8)
where PD = 1 − PM is the probability of detection of SPRT. By substituting the above
equation into Eq. (4.5) and utilizing the fact that E[SN ] = const = C for a given IDS with










We can see that the SPRT test continues sampling as long as the log-likelihood
ratio takes values within the interval (A,B) and stops taking more samples the first time
it exceeds it. Once stopped, the decision function dN decides in favor of hypothesis H1
when SN exceeds the largest threshold and in favor of H0 when SN is below the smallest
threshold. If in particular the data are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)







= Sn−1 + ln
f1(xn)
f0(xn)
, S0 = 0. (4.10)
Here fi(x) is the common probability density function (pdf) of the samples under hypoth-
esis Hi, i = 0, 1. Notice that the recurrent relation on the right hand side of Eq.(4.10)
allows for an efficient computation of the statistics Sn which requires only constant num-
ber of operations per time step and finite memory (we only need to store Sn as opposed
to the whole sequence {xn, . . . , x1}).
Optimality of SPRT in the sense described in (4.1) is assured only when the data are
i.i.d. under both hypotheses [19]. For other data models there exists a very rich literature
referring to asymptotic optimality results (see for example [20]). Concluding, we should
also mention that the actual optimality of SPRT is significantly stronger than the one
24
mentioned in (4.1). The SPRT not only minimizes the average delay under H1 but also
simultaneously minimizes the alternative average delay E0[N ]. This double optimality
property is rather remarkable and not encountered in any other detection scheme.
It is clear from the previous discussion that our intention is to follow a sequential
approach for the detection of attacks. It is important to notice that in order to be able to
use the SPRT it is necessary to specify both probability density functions fi(x), i = 0, 1
under the two hypotheses. Although the pdf f0(x) of a legitimate node is known, this
is not the case for an attacker. Furthermore, specifying a candidate density f1(x) for an
attacker without some proper analysis may result in serious performance degradation if
the attacker’s strategy diverges from our selection.
In order to be able to propose a specific detection rule we need to clarify and
mathematically formulate the notion of an “attack”. We should however place our main
emphasis to attacks that incur large gains for the attacker (result in higher chances of
channel access). An attack will then have devastating effects for the network, in the sense
that it would deny channel access to the other nodes and would lead to unfair sharing of
the channel. Besides, if we assume that the detection of an attack is followed by commu-
nication of the attack event further in the network so as to launch a network response, it
would be rather inefficient for the algorithm to consider less significant (and potentially
more frequent) attacks and initiate responses for them. Instead, it is meaningful for the
detection system to focus on encountering the most significant attacks and at the same
time not to consume resources of any kind (processor power, energy, time or bandwidth)
for dealing with attacks whose effect on performance is rather marginal.
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4.3 Min-max robust detection: definition of uncertainty class
Previously, we stressed the sequential nature of our approach and the implicit need
to consider most significant attacks. The approach should also cope with the encountered
(statistically) uncertain operational environment of a wireless network, namely the random
nature of protocols and the unpredictable misbehavior or attack instances. Hence, it is
desirable to rely on robust detection rules that would perform well regardless of uncertain
conditions. In this work, we adopt the min-max robust detection approach where the goal
is to optimize performance for the worst-case instance of uncertainty. More specifically,
the goal is to identify the least favorable operating point of a system in the presence of
uncertainty and subsequently find the strategy the optimizes system performance when
operating in that point. In our case, the least favorable operating point corresponds to the
worst-case instance of an attack and the optimal strategy amounts to the optimal detection
rule. System performance is measured in terms of number of required observation samples
to derive a decision.
A basic notion in min-max approaches is that of a saddle point. A strategy (detection
rule) D? = (N?, d?N ) and an operating point (attack) f?1 in the uncertainty class form a
saddle point if:
1. For the attack f?1 , any detection rule D other than D? has worse performance.
Namely D? is the optimal detection rule for attack f?1 in terms of minimum (average)
number of required observations.
2. For the detection rule D?, any attack f1 from the uncertainty class, other than f?1
gives better performance. Namely, detection rule D? has its worst performance for
attack f?1 .
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Implicit in the min-max approach is the assumption that the attacker has full knowl-
edge of the employed detection rule. Thus, it can create a misbehavior strategy that max-
imizes the number of required samples for misbehavior detection delaying the detection
as much as possible. Therefore, our approach refers to the case of an intelligent attacker
that can adapt its misbehavior policy so as to avoid detection. One issue that needs to be
clarified is the structure of this attack strategy. Subsequently, by deriving the detection
rule and the performance for that case, we can obtain an (attainable) upper bound on
performance over all possible attacks.
4.3.1 Problem description and assumptions
According to the IEEE 802.11 MAC standard, the back-off for each legitimate node is
selected from a set of values in a contention window interval based on uniform distribution.
The length of contention window is 2iW for the ith retransmission attempt, where W is
the minimum length of the contention window. In general, some back-off values will be
selected uniformly from [0,W ] and others will be selected uniformly from intervals [0, 2iW ],
for i = 1, . . . , Imax where Imax is the maximum number of re-transmission attempts.
Without loss of generality, we can scale down a back-off value that is selected uniformly in
[0, 2iW ] by a factor of 2i, so that all back-offs can be considered to be uniformly selected
from [0,W ]. We now present the problem and justify the above assumptions.
Assume each station generates a sequence of random back-offs X1, X2, . . . , Xi in
order to access the channel. The back-off values of each legitimate protocol participant
are then distributed according to the pdf f0(x), which is specified by the MAC layer
protocol. Furthermore, the pdf of the misbehaving participants is unknown to the system
and is denoted with f1(x).
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We assume that a detection agent (e.g., the access point) monitors and collects the
back-off values of a given station. It is important to note that observations are not per-
fect and can be hindered by concurrent transmissions or external sources of noise. It is
impossible for a passive monitoring agent to know the internal exponential back-off stage
of a given monitored station due to collisions, or to the fact that a station might not have
anything to transmit. Furthermore, in practical applications the number of false alarms
in anomaly detection schemes is very high. Consequently, instead of building a “nor-
mal” profile of network operation with anomaly detection schemes, we utilize specification
based detection. In our setup we identify “normal” (i.e., a behavior consistent with the
IEEE 802.11 specification) profile of a backlogged station in the IEEE 802.11 without any
competing nodes, and notice that its back-off process X1, X2, . . . , Xi can be characterized
with pdf f0(xi) = 1/(W + 1) for xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , W} and zero otherwise. We claim that
this assumption minimizes the probability of false alarms due to imperfect observations.
At the same time, a safe upper bound on the amount of damaging effects a misbehaving
station can cause to the network is maintained.
Although our theoretical results utilize the above expression for f0, the experimental
setting utilizes the original implementation of the IEEE 802.11 MAC. In this case, the
detection agent needs to deal with observed values of xi larger than W , which can be due
to collisions or due to the exponential back-off specification in the IEEE 802.11.
4.3.2 Adversary model
We assume that the adversary has full control over the pdf f1(x) and the back-
off values it generates. In addition to that, we assume that the adversary is intelligent,
i.e. the adversary knows everything the detection agent knows and can infer the same
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conclusions as the detection agent. As it has already been mentioned, this assumption
enables the detector to obtain the upper bound on the detection delay. In this work we
consider continuously back-logged nodes that always have packets to send. Thus, the gain
of the adversary G is signified by the percentage of time in which it obtains access to the
medium. This in turn depends directly on the relative values of back-offs used by the
attacker and by the legitimate nodes. In particular, the attacker competes with the node
that has selected the smallest back-off value out of all nodes.
In order to derive an expression for the gain of the adversary, we first need to
compute the probability P1 of the adversary to access the channel as a function of the
pdfs f1(.) and f0(.). Following the IEEE 802.11 protocol, the back-off counter of any
node freezes during the transmissions and reactivates during free periods. Therefore, let
us observe the back-off times during a fixed period T that does not include transmission
intervals. Consider first the case of one misbehaving and one legitimate node and assume
that within the time period T , we observe X1, . . . , XN , N samples of the attacker’s back-
off and Y1, . . . , YM , M samples of the legitimate node’s back-offs. It is then clear that
the attacker’s percentage of accessing the channel during the period T is N/(N + M). In
order to obtain the desired probability we simply need to compute the limit of this ratio
as T →∞. Notice that
X1 + · · ·+ XN ≤ T < X1 + · · ·+ XN+1





























Letting T →∞ results in N, M →∞ and from the previous double inequality, by applying
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Using exactly similar reasoning the probability P1, for the case of one misbehaving node















where in the last equality we have used the fact that the average back-off of a legitimate
node is W/2 (because f0 is uniform in [0,W ]).
If the attacker were legitimate then E1[X] = E0[Y ] and his probability of accessing
the channel, from Eq. (4.13), would have been 1/(n+1). It is therefore clear that whenever
E1[X] = εE0[Y ], with ε ∈ (0, 1) (4.14)







, where η =
1 + n
1 + εn
∈ (1, n + 1). (4.15)
In other words his probability of accessing the channel is greater than the corresponding
probability of any legitimate node by a factor η > 1.
Using the simple modelling introduced in the previous paragraph we are now able
to quantify the notion of an “attack”. Let η be a quantity that satisfies 1 < η < n+1 and
consider the class Fη of all pdfs that induce a probability P1 of accessing the channel that













, 1 < η < n + 1. (4.16)
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This class includes all possible attacks for which the incurred relative gain exceeds the
legitimate one by (η − 1) × 100%. The class Fη is the uncertainty class of the robust
approach and η is a tunable parameter. Notice from Eq. (4.15) that since P1 is a probability
the gain factor η must not exceed n + 1 in order for the previous inequality to produce a
nonempty class Fη.
By defining the class Fη, we imply that the detection scheme should focus on attacks
with larger impact to system performance and not on small-scale or short-term attacks.
We define the severity of the attack by changing the gain factor η. Values of η larger but
close to 1 are equivalent to low-impact attacks whereas values significantly larger than 1
are equivalent to DoS attacks.
We note that each system will have different tolerance levels for different behaviors
and consequently the class Fη cannot be universally defined. We say that a system S
is robust against a class of attacks Fη if its IDS can detect an adversary A ∈ Fη with
detection delay Td (or N if the delay is measured in observed number of samples), while
maintaining the performance level of the system above the pre-defined threshold PT . The
parameters T and PT are not fixed and vary depending on how strict security is required
in a given system. A system S is optimal if its IDS is capable of constructing a universal
detection strategy that minimizes the detection delay for the worst-case attack scenario.
We now formally define a robust IDS.
Definition 4.3.1. An IDS is robust against a class of attacks Fη, if it can detect any
adversary A ∈ Fη with detection delay Td < Tdc, where Tdc is the detection delay for which
the performance level of legitimate protocol participants falls below the pre-defined threshold
PT , while maintaining the pre-defined probability of false alarms PFA and probability of
miss PM .
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In the light of the previously defined Fη, it is now possible to formally define ca-
pabilities of the adversary. We assume the adversary has full control over his actions. In
order to describe the capabilities of the attacker we define a feasible class of attacks F
that describes his probable set of actions. In addition to that, we assume that for each
attack strategy AS ∈ F there exists an associated gain of the adversary G. If there exist k
possible attack strategies within the given class F , then the strategy AS1 corresponds to
legitimate behavior and the strategy ASk corresponds to the DoS attack. Consequently,
each of the strategies results in gains G1 and Gk respectively.
We assume the objective of the adversary is to design an access policy which max-
imizes his gain G over the defined period of time, while minimizing the probability of
detection, PD. If the adversary is malicious, his goal is to minimize the gain of the other
participants. On the other hand, a greedy adversary attempts to maximize his own gain,
which may or may not result in minimizing the gain of the other participants. We now
formally define the notion of an intelligent adversary.
Definition 4.3.2. An adversary A is intelligent if, given a set of attack strategies AS ∈ F ,
it is always capable to choose an appropriate strategy ASi , i = 1, . . . , k that minimizes the
probability of detection PD for a given gain Gi, i = 1, . . . , k.
4.4 Min-max robust detection: derivation of the worst-case attack
Hypothesis H0 concerns legitimate operation and thus the corresponding pdf f0(x),
as was mentioned before, is the uniform one. Hypothesis H1 corresponds to misbehavior
with unknown pdf f1(x) ∈ Fη.
The objective of a detection rule is to minimize the number of the required obser-
vation samples N so as to derive a decision regarding the existence or not of misbehavior.
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The performance of a detection scheme is quantified by the average number of samples
E1[N ] needed until a decision is reached, where the average is taken with respect to the
distribution f1(x) employed by the attacker. This expectation is clearly a function of the
adopted detection rule D and the pdf f1(x), that is,
E1[N ] = φ(D, f1). (4.17)
Let Tα,β denote the class of all sequential tests for which the false alarm and missed
detection probabilities do not exceed some specified levels α and β respectively. Consider
also the class Fη of densities f1(x) as in (4.16) for some prescribed gain factor η > 1. In the
context of the min-max robust detection framework, the goal is to optimize performance






Solving a min-max problem is usually complicated, unless one can obtain a saddle
point solution.
Definition 4.4.1. A pair (D?, f?1 ) is called a saddle point of the function φ if
φ(D?, f1) ≤ φ(D?, f?1 ) ≤ φ(D, f?1 ); ∀D ∈ Tα,β, ∀f1 ∈ Fη. (4.19)
As we can see a saddle point (D?, f?1 ) of φ consists of a detection scheme D? and
an attack distribution f?1 . Equation (4.19) is a formal statement of properties 1 and 2
that were mentioned in Section 4.3. The property that is important here in connection to
the min-max problem (4.18) is the fact that the saddle point pair (D?, f?1 ) also solves the





φ(D, f1) ≥ sup
f1∈Fη
φ(D?, f1) = φ(D?, f?1 ). (4.20)
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Saddle point solutions are much easier to obtain than their min-max counterparts. Un-
fortunately saddle point solutions do not always exist. In view of Eq. (4.20), instead of
solving Eq. (4.18) it is sufficient to find the saddle point that solves Eq. (4.19). The saddle
point pair (D?, f?1 ) is specified in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4.2. Let the gain factor η ∈ (1, n + 1) and the maximal allowable decision
error probabilities α, β be given. Then the pair (D?, f?1 ) which asymptotically (for small








eµ − 1 , (4.21)












The corresponding decision rule D? = (N?, dN?) is the SPRT test that discriminates be-
















; S?0 = 0. (4.23)
N? = inf
n





1 if S?N ≥ B
0 if S?N ≤ A.
(4.25)
Proof. We first note that (4.22) is equivalent to
∫ W
0






which assures that f?1 (x) defined in (4.21) is a member of the uncertainty class Fη. Let us
now demonstrate that for any gain factor η ∈ (1, n + 1) there always exists µ ∈ (0,∞) so
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that (4.22) is true. Notice that for η ∈ (1, n+1) we have that 1/(n+1) < η/(n+1) < 1. If





then Φ(µ) is a continuous function of µ. Furthermore we
observe that Φ(0) = 1 > η/(n+1); while one can show that limµ→∞ Φ(µ) = 0 < η/(n+1).
Since we can find two values of µ one yielding a smaller and another a larger value than
η/(n + 1), due to continuity, we can argue that there exists µ > 0 such that the equality
in (4.22) is assured. In fact this µ is unique since it is also possible to show that Φ(µ) is
strictly decreasing.
Let us now proceed to the saddle point problem given by Eq. (4.19). We observe
that the right hand side of the inequality suggests that D? must be the optimum detection
structure for f?1 (x). Indeed, this is how D? is defined, since it is selected as the SPRT test
that optimally discriminates between f?1 (x) and the uniform f0(x).
In order to show that the left hand side is also true, we adopt an asymptotic ap-
proach. By considering that the two maximal error probabilities α, β are small, it is
possible to use efficient approximations for the two thresholds A,B and the average de-








and the expected delay by the expression






In fact these formulas become exact if the SPRT statistics S?n hits exactly (does not
overshoot) the two thresholds A,B at the time of stopping. This for example happens in
continuous-time and continuous-path processes.
Since the numerator in the previous formula is constant, the left hand side inequality
in (4.19) is true if the denominator in Eq. (4.28) is minimized for f1(x) = f?1 (x). Because
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f?1 (x) dx, (4.29)
where for the first inequality we used (4.16) and for the last two equalities we used
(4.21),(4.26). This concludes the proof.
Regarding Theorem4.4.2 we would like to point out that our selection of f?1 (x) was
in fact the outcome of a rigorous analysis. We basically used the additional property
enjoyed by the saddle point solution to solve not only the min-max problem in (4.18) but






It turns out that this latter problem can be solved directly (using standard variational
techniques), thus providing us with a suitable candidate pdf f?1 (x) for the saddle point
problem (4.20). Of course we then need to go through the preceding proof in order to
establish that f?1 (x) is indeed the correct pdf.
As it was mentioned above, the min-max robust detection approach captures the
case of an intelligent adaptive attacker. The SPRT algorithm is part of the intrusion
detection system module that resides at an observer node. With the method outlined in
this chapter, an observer node monitors the behavior of another node with the objective to
derive a decision as fast as possible. In other words, the observer (and hence the system)
attempts to minimize the number of required samples so as to improve its payoff in terms
of improved chances for channel access. On the other hand, an intelligent attacker that
36
knows the detection algorithm attempts to delay this decision as much as possible so as
to increase his own benefit in terms of chances for channel access. The attacker aims at a
strategy that causes performance degradation for other nodes by remaining undetected.
At this point, an additional comment regarding the adversary assumptions is in
place. In this specific setting we assume that the adversary is aware that an IDS is
using the SPRT as a detection strategy and will stop misbehaving before it is detected.
Although this may seem as a disadvantage, it is actually not. The optimal IDS forces and
adversary to either (i) occasionally follow the protocol rules and shift below the threshold
B; (ii) apply a mild misbehavior strategy that is below the threshold B at all times or (iii)
relocate as soon as the threshold B is approached. In (i) and (ii) the attacker has to stop
misbehaving or compromise with achieving a very mild advantage over other participants.
In case (iii) the deployment of an optimal IDS forces an adversary to relocate frequently,
therefore increasing the cost of launching an attack. It is important to note that the
relocation space of an adversary is not infinite, i.e. a greedy user has to send packets to
another node. Unless there is a set of collaborating adversaries, an adversary that chooses
to employ aggressive misbehavior policy will be quickly detected.
4.5 Experimental evaluation of optimal attack strategies
In this section we perform experimental evaluation of optimal attack strategies de-
rived in the previous section. The goal of the evaluation is to assess the performance of
our approach and identify the relative impact of different system parameters on it. In
order to evaluate the detection delay of our detection scheme against a specific class of
attacks, the performance is measured in terms of the average required number of obser-
vation samples, E[N ] in order to derive a decision, which essentially denotes the delay in
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detecting a misbehavior instance. In addition to that, we investigate the influence of the
number of regular participants on the form of the least favorable distribution f∗1 (x).
Parameter η defines the class of attacks of interest since it specifies the incurred
relative gain of the attacker in terms of the probability of channel access. In that sense,
η can be interpreted as a sensitivity parameter of the detection scheme with respect to
attacks, which is determined according to the IDS requirements. IEEE 802.11 MAC is
implemented and MATLAB is used to evaluate the performance of our scheme, taking
into account the sequence of observed back-offs.
In Fig.4.1 we present the form of the least favorable attack pdf f?1 (x) as a function
of the gain factor η and the number of legitimate nodes n.
Figure 4.1: Form of least favorable pdf f?1 (x): a) number of legitimate nodes n = 2, 1
malicious node and gain factor η = 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5; b) gain factor η = 1.5 and number of
legitimate nodes n = 1, 2, 5,∞; c) absolute gain ηn+1 = 12 and number of legitimate nodes
n = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20.
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Fig. 4.1a depicts the form of the density for n = 2 legitimate nodes competing with
one attacker for values of the gain factor η = 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5. We observe that as η → 3 (the
maximum possible gain for n = 2) the density tends to a Dirac delta function at x = 0
which corresponds to DoS attack, representing the extreme case of misbehavior where the
attacker consumes all the available resources.
In Fig. 4.1b we fix the gain factor to η = 1.5 (the attacker enjoys 50% more access
to the channel than a legitimate node) and plot f?1 (x) for number of legitimate nodes
n = 1, 2, 5,∞. We observe that as the number n of legitimate nodes increases, the at-
tacker converges towards a less aggressive strategy. The interesting point is that the least
favorable pdf converges very quickly to a limiting function as the number of legitimate
nodes increases. This example confirms that it is possible to detect an attacker even if
there is a large number of legitimate nodes present, since the attacker in order to maintain
his relative gain must use a pdf which differs from the nominal uniform.
Instead of fixing the attacker’s gain relatively to the gain of a legitimate node,
we now examine what happens when the attacker follows a more aggressive policy and
demands channel access for a constant percentage of time, regardless of the number of
existing nodes. To achieve this goal, the gain factor η must be selected so that η 1n+1
is a constant. Fig. 4.1c depicts this specific scenario for ηn+1 =
1
2 . In other words, the
attacker has access to the channel 50% of the time, regardless of the number of competing
nodes. We can see that when n = 1 the attacker behaves legitimately, but as the number
n of legitimate nodes increases, the attacker quickly resorts to the strategies that are of
DoS type in order to maintain this fixed access percentage. This is evident from the fact
















































Figure 4.2: Average Detection Delay E[N ] as a function of (a) gain factor η; (b) absolute
gain ηn+1 for α = β = 0.01
In order to obtain some intuition from our results, we consider the case of one
attacker competing with n ≥ 1 legitimate nodes. In Fig. 4.2a we depict the average
required number of observation samples as a function of the parameter η. We fix the
probability of detection and the probability of false alarm to 0.99 and 0.01 respectively
and measure the Average Detection Delay E[N ] for 1 < η < n + 1. The graph shows that
low values of η prolong the detection procedure, since in that case the attacker does not
deviate significantly from the protocol. On the other hand, a large η signifies a class of
increasingly aggressive attacks for which the detection is achieved with very small delay.
Due to the fact that the value of η is limited with the number of legitimate nodes, we
cannot compare the performance of the system for different values of n unless the absolute
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gain ηn+1 is used. In Fig. 4.2b we depict E[N ] as a function of the absolute gain. It can
be seen that detection becomes more efficient as the number of participating legitimate
nodes increases. For example, for an absolute gain of 0.6, the IDS will require 10 times
less samples to detect misbehavior for n = 5, than for the case of n = 1.
Finally, we implement the worst-case attack pdf characterized by Eq. 4.21 in the
network simulator OPNET. We take advantage of the experimental setup and perform
evaluation as a tradeoff between the average time to detection, Td, and the average time
to false alarm,Tfa, a quantity that is more meaningful and intuitive in practice. It is im-
portant to emphasize that the realistic false alarm rate used by actual intrusion detection
systems is much lower than α = 0.01 used in the theoretical analysis. We claim that this
false alarm rate leads to an accurate estimate of the false alarm rates that need to be
satisfied in actual anomaly detection systems [22, 23]. Due to that fact we set β = 0.01
and vary α from 10−2 up to 10−10 (where α = 10−10 corresponds to one false alarm dur-
ing the whole simulation period). The back-off distribution of an optimal attacker was
implemented in the network simulator OPNET and tests were performed for various lev-
els of false alarms. The backlogged environment in OPNET was created by employing a
relatively high packet arrival rate per unit of time: the results were collected for the expo-
nential(0.01) packet arrival rate and the packet size was 2048 bytes. The results for both
legitimate and malicious behavior were collected over a fixed period of 1.5min. We note
that the simulations were performed with nodes that followed the standard IEEE 802.11
access protocol (with exponential back-off). The system’s performance was evaluated for
three values of absolute gain: 0.5, 0.6 and 0.8 and the results are presented in Fig. 4.3.
By observing the tradeoff curves in Fig. 4.3 we conclude that the system’s detection delay
decreases significantly as the attacker’s absolute gain increases. To illustrate this claim,
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Figure 4.3: Tradeoff curve for ηn+1 = 0.5, 0.6, 0.8 and n = 2.
we observe the best case system performance, i. e. one false alarm over the whole sim-
ulation period of 1.5min, and note that the detection delay for the absolute gain of 80%
is approximately 3.5 times shorter than in the case when the absolute gain is 50%. This
again confirms the efficiency of our proposed detection system against most aggressive
worst-case optimal attacks. In order to illustrate the influence of the number of legitimate
Figure 4.4: Tradeoff curve for ηn+1 = 0.5 and n = 2, 3.
competing nodes on the detection time, we compare the performance of the detection
system for the case when n = 2 and n = 5. In order to obtain fair comparison, we use
the same value of absolute gain, ηn+1 = 0.5. The results are presented in Fig. 4.4. As
expected, all nodes experience higher number of collisions in the congested environment,
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resulting in delayed detection. It is important to note that the traffic generation rate used
in Fig. 4.4 is lower than the one used in Fig. 4.3. By observing the curves for ηn+1 = 0.5 in
both figures, we note that the detection system experiences larger delay when lower traffic
rates are used, which is logical since all nodes access channel less frequently, generating
smaller number of back-off samples within the same time interval.
4.5.1 Impact of multiple competing nodes on the performance of the optimal at-
tacker






















Figure 4.5: Tradeoff curve for ηn+1 = 0.6 and n = 2, 3, 4, 5.
4.5.2 Performance comparison of MAC layer misbehavior detection schemes
In Sect. 4.1 we argued that (i) the performance of a sub-optimal detection scheme
will be degraded in the presence of an optimal attack and (ii) an attacker that deploys a
sub-optimal strategy (i.e. strategy that is constructed against a specific detection system)
will be detected with substantially smaller detection delay than the optimal one when a
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Figure 4.6: Tradeoff curve for ηn+1 = 0.5 and n = 2, 3, 4.
quickest detection scheme (i.e. optimal detection scheme) is deployed. We now confirm
the above statement by experimental evaluation. In particular, as an example of a sub-
optimal detection scheme we analyze the performance of DOMINO [2] and compare its
performance against the optimal, SPRT-based detection scheme, in the presence of optimal
and sub-optimal attacks.
The back-off distribution of the optimal attacker was implemented in the network
simulator OPNET and tests were performed for various levels of false alarms. The results
presented in this section correspond to the scenario consisting of two legitimate and one
selfish node competing for channel access. It is important to mention that the result-
ing performance comparison of DOMINO and SPRT does not change for any number of
competing nodes. SPRT always exhibits the best performance.
In order to demonstrate the performance of all detection schemes, we choose to
present the results for the scenario where the attacker attempts to access channel for
60% of the time (as opposed to 33% if it was behaving legitimately). The backlogged
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environment in OPNET was created by employing a relatively high packet arrival rate per
unit of time: the results were collected for the exponential(0.01) packet arrival rate and
the packet size was 2048 bytes. The results for both legitimate and malicious behavior
were collected over a fixed period of 100s.
The evaluation was performed as a tradeoff between the average time to detection
and the average time to false alarm. It is important to mention that the theoretical
performance evaluation of both DOMINO and SPRT was measured in number of samples.
Here, however, we take advantage of the experimental setup and measure time in number
of seconds, a quantity that is more meaningful and intuitive in practice.
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DOMINO detection of f
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DOMINO detection of f
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*
Figure 4.7: Tradeoff curves for DOMINO algorithm. One curve shows its performance
when detecting an adversary that chooses fD1 and the other is the performance when
detecting an adversary that chooses f∗1
The first step in our experimental evaluation is to show that the performance of
a sub-optimal detection scheme (DOMINO) is degraded in the presence of an optimal
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attack f∗1 . Fig. 4.7 provides experimental evidence confirming our predictions. Namely,
DOMINO detection scheme was constructed for detection of a specific class of attacks
described in [2, 24]. We denote that class of attacks with fD1 . As it can be seen from
Fig. 4.7, the detection delay of DOMINO algorithm increases up to 40% when an optimal
attack strategy f∗1 is deployed. More specifically, the results presented in Fig. 4.7 illustrate
the fact that an adversary using f∗1 against DOMINO can misbehave for longer periods of
time without being detected than by using pD1 . We now evaluate the performance of an








Tradeoff curves for SPRT
SPRT detection of f
1
*
SPRT detection of f
1
D
Figure 4.8: Tradeoff curves for SPRT algorithm. One curve shows its performance when
detecting an adversary that chooses fD1 and the other is the performance when detecting
an adversary that chooses f∗1 .
attacker that deploys a sub-optimal strategy fD1 (which was constructed against DOMINO
detection scheme) against the quickest detection (SPRT) scheme and compare it with the
performance of an attacker that deploys optimal strategy f∗1 . The results are presented
in Fig. 4.8. As expected, a sub-optimal attack fD1 is detected with a substantially smaller
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Tradeoff curves for SPRT and DOMINO
SPRT detection of f
1
*
DOMINO detection of f
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*
Figure 4.9: Tradeoff curves for SPRT and DOMINO algorithms.
detection delay than the optimal one when the SPRT-based detection scheme (i.e. optimal
detection scheme) is deployed. More specifically, we observe that the detection delay for a
sub-optimal strategy is approximately 50% smaller than the one for the optimal strategy.
We now test how the optimal (SPRT) and sub-optimal (DOMINO) detection al-
gorithms compare to each other. Fig. 4.9 shows that SPRT significantly outperforms
DOMINO in the presence of an optimal attacker. We have therefore confirmed by experi-
mental evaluation that SPRT is the best test when the adversary selects f∗1 . Nevertheless,
f∗1 can be argued to be a good adversarial strategy against any detector in the asymptotic
observation case, since f∗1 is in fact minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the
specified pdf f0. The result is that the probability of detection of any algorithm (when
the false alarm rate goes to zero) is upper bounded by 2D(f1||f0), where D(p||q) denotes
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two pdf’s [25]. On the other hand, it was not
possible to find any theoretical motivation for the definition of fD1 and, hence, we claim
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The problem treatment in Chapter 4 assumed the existence of a single intelligent
adversary and the scenario where two or more protocol participants collaborate in order
to degrade the performance of legitimate participants was not considered. In this chapter
we extend the proposed framework to the case of n ≥ 2 collaborating adversaries and
evaluate the performance of quickest detection scheme under this setting. We show that,
although extremely efficient in terms of increased detection delay and performance losses
of the system, the collaborative strategies are difficult to implement due to synchronization
issues that arise from random nature of the protocol and the unpredictability of wireless
medium.
As we have already pointed out, we consider detection strategies in the presence of
intelligent misbehaving nodes that are aware of the existence of monitoring neighboring
nodes and adapt their access policies in order to avoid detection. Due to the fact that we
now deal with multiple adversaries that collaborate with the common goal of disrupting
network functionality, additional assumptions need to be adopted. First of all, we assume
that colluding nodes collaborate by exchanging information and by taking actions that
amplify each other’s effects on network functionality. More specifically, we assume that
each individual action can produce a desired effect only if properly coordinated with other
actions. The rest of the assumptions about the adversary model are identical as in the
case of a single adversary. We assume that the adversaries are knowledgeable, i.e. they
know everything a monitoring node knows about the detection scheme and intelligent,
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i.e. they can make inferences about the situation in the same way the monitoring nodes
can. We assume that the goal of the misbehaving hosts is to choose an optimal attack
strategy that minimizes the probability of detection PD (or equivalently a strategy that
maximizes the probability of avoiding detection PM ), while maximizing their gain (access
to the channel).
It is now clear that two additional difficulties arise in this new setting, one at the side
of the detector and one at the side of collaborating adversaries. As it has been pointed out,
the adversaries need to be synchronized and consequently need to be able to communicate
(exchange information) at all times in order to launch an efficient attack. On the other
hand, the detector needs to be able to efficiently correlate individual actions across users
in order to identify a single attack. Hence, a robust detector needs to be able to both
localize and detect an ongoing collaborative attack with minimum delay.
5.1 Definition of the Uncertainty Class
Following the approach proposed in Sect. 4.3 we again adopt a min-max robust
approach for defining the uncertainty class. In this setting we assume the detection system
adopts the optimal detection rule D?12 = (N?12, d?N12) and the collaborating adversaries
adopt the optimal access policy f?12. The goal of the adversaries is to create a misbehavior
strategy that maximizes the number of required samples for misbehavior detection delaying
the detection as much as possible. On the other hand, the adversaries aim to disrupt
the functionality of the network and minimize the probability of access to the legitimate
protocol participants.
In order to quantify the performance of the detection scheme and the attacker, we
introduce the parameter η, which defines the class of attacks of interest and specifies the
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incurred relative gain of the attacker in terms of the probability of channel access. In that
sense, η can be interpreted as a sensitivity parameter of the detection scheme with respect
to attacks, which is determined according to the IDS requirements.
In this section we follow the same set of assumptions about the IEEE 802.11 MAC
protocol as in Chapter 4. We assume that one of misbehaving collaborating nodes and a
legitimate node intend to access the channel at the same time instance. In order to have
a fair basis for comparison, assume that they start their back-off timers at the same time.
We let the random variable X0 stand for the back-off value of a legitimate user, hence it
is uniformly distributed in [0,W ]. Also, let the random variables X1 and X2 stand for the
misbehaving nodes (attackers), with unknown pdf f12(x1, x2) with support [0,W ]. The
relative advantage of the attacker is quantified as the probability of accessing the channel,
or equivalently the probability that its back-off is smaller than that of the legitimate node,
Pr(X0 < min(X1, X2)).
Suppose that all nodes were legitimate. If p is the access probability of each node,
then the probability of successful channel access achieves fairness for p∗ = 1/3 for each
node. Now, if two nodes collaborate, they receive gain from their attack if Pr(X0 <










f12(x1, x2) dx1 dx2 ≤ η3
}
. (5.1)
where we used the fact that f0(x) = 1W . The class defined by expression 5.1 includes
attacks for which the incurred relative loss of the legitimate participants exceeds a certain
amount (or equivalently, incurred relative gain exceeds a certain amount). The class Fη is
the uncertainty class of the robust approach and the parameter η is a tunable parameter.
By defining the class Fη, we imply that the detection scheme should focus on attacks with
larger impact to system performance and not on small-scale or short-term attacks.
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5.2 Derivation of the worst-case attack for n=2 adversaries
By following the approach from Chap. 4, we assume that hypothesis H0 concerns
legitimate operation and thus the corresponding pdf f0(x), is the uniform one. Hypothesis
H1 corresponds to misbehavior with unknown pdf f12(x1, x2) ∈ Fη. Since the objective
of a detection rule is to minimize the number of observation samples N12 needed for
deriving a decision regarding the existence or not of misbehavior, we adopt the SPRT as
our optimal detection rule D?c for detection of the worst-case attack f?12. The performance
of the optimal detection scheme is again quantified by the average number of samples
E12[N ] needed until a decision is reached, where the average is taken with respect to the
distribution f12(x1, x2) employed by the attacker. This expectation is a function of the
adopted detection rule D12 and the pdf f12(x1, x2)
E12[N ] = φ(D12, f12(x1, x2)). (5.2)










where f0(xi) = 1W (denotes the uniform distribution of normal operation), C = aPD +
b(1−PD), and the expectation in the denominator is with respect to the unknown attack
distribution f12. In the context of the minmax robust detection framework, the goal is to
optimize the performance of the detection scheme in the presence of the worst-case attack,















f12(x1x2) ln f12(x1x2)dx1dx2 (5.5)













f12(x1x2)dx1dx2 ≤ η3 (5.7)
The first constraint enforces the fact that f12 is a pdf and the second one holds due to
the fact that f12 ∈ Fη. By applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we find
that the function f∗12(x1, x2) has the following form:
f∗12(x1, x2) = e
−1−λe−µ min(x1,x2)/W (5.8)
where λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers that correspond to the constraints and are
functions of W and η only. These can be obtained by the system of equations:





(2e−µ + µe−µ − 2 + µ) = η
3
e1+λ
For the purpose of illustrating the actual effects of collaborating adversaries on the perfor-
mance of the system we now observe two collaborating adversaries under the assumption
that they act as a single adversary. Fig. 5.1 depicts the form of the density f12 of two
collaborating attackers for various values of the parameter η. Again, as in Chap. 4, we
observe that as η → 1, the density tends to a Dirac delta function at x = 0, which cor-
responds to DoS attack. However, unlike in the case of a single attacker, the detection
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system does not observe the pdf from the Fig. 5.1 until the stage of localization. The
IDS, or more specifically the observers, see each adversary as a separate entity, therefore
observing significantly milder strategy than the one that is actually being used against
the system, as we will see in Sect. 5.4.




















Figure 5.1: The optimal pdf of colluding adversaries.
Interestingly, Eq. (5.8) shows that the worst-case attack distribution f∗12 again takes
exponential form, just like in the case of a single adversary. We now need to prove that
the pair D?12, f?12 is a saddle point of the function φ, where the saddle point was defined by
Def. 4.19. The right hand side of the inequality suggests that D?12 must be the optimum
detection structure for f?12(x1, x2). Indeed, this is how D?12 is defined, since it is selected
as the SPRT test that optimally discriminates between f?12 and the uniform pdf f0. This
proves the right hand side of the saddle point inequality. Following the identical approach
as in the case of Theorem4.4.2, we prove that φ(D?12, f?12) ≥ φ(D?12, f12) for all f12 ∈ Fη,
therefore proving the left inequality in (4.19). We have now shown that the pair (D?12, f?12),
where D?12 is SPRT and f?12(x1, x2) is the exponential density constitute a saddle point of
φ. This means that the min-max equality holds and we can interchange the order of min
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has the same solution with (4.18).
As was mentioned above, the min-max robust detection approach captures the case
of an intelligent adaptive attacker. The SPRT algorithm is part of the intrusion detec-
tion system module that resides at an observer node. In other words, the observer (and
hence the system) attempts to minimize the number of required samples so as to improve
its payoff in terms of improved chances for channel access. On the other hand, an in-
telligent attacker that knows the detection algorithm attempts to delay this decision as
much as possible so as to increase his own benefit in terms of chances for channel access.
The attacker aims at a strategy that causes performance degradation for other nodes by
remaining undetected.
Naturally, if the attacker is intelligent and is aware of the optimal detection strategy
of the given system, he can choose to misbehave until the estimated detection point and
after that he can either obey the protocol rules for certain time or choose to relocate. The
quickest detection framework employed in our analysis forces the adversary to follow the
protocol rules or relocate as often as possible, thereby increasing the cost of launching an
attack.
5.3 Derivation of the worst-case attack for n > 2 adversaries
In order to proceed towards derivation of the worst-case attack for the case of n > 2
adversaries we first redefine the uncertainty class described by Eq. 5.1. In the setup with
more than 2 collaborating adversaries, the relative advantage of the adversaries is again
quantified as the probability of accessing the channel, or equivalently the probability that
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their back-off is smaller than that of the legitimate node.
Suppose that we observe the behavior of n + 1 legitimate nodes, where n > 1. If
p is the access probability of each node, then the probability of successful channel access
achieves fairness for p∗ = 1n+1 for each node. Now, if n nodes collaborate, they receive
gain from their attack if Pr(X0 < min(X1, . . . , Xn)) ≤ ηn+1 . In order to quantify this, let
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Assuming that the SPRT is used, we again seek an attack distribution f∗ such that
φ(d∗, f∗) ≥ φ(d∗, f) for all other attacks f ∈ Fη.










where f0(xi) = 1/W (denotes the uniform distribution of normal operation), C = aPD +
b(1−PD), and the expectation in the denominator is with respect to the unknown attack
distribution f . Since C is a constant, the problem of finding the attack that maximizes
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The first constraint enforces the fact that f is a pdf and the second one holds due to the
fact that f ∈ Fη. By applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we find that
the function f∗1...n(x1, . . . , xn) has the following form:
f∗1...n(x1, . . . , xn) = e
−1−λe−µ min(x1,...,xn)/W (5.16)
where λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers that correspond to the constraints and are
functions of W and η only. These can be obtained by numerically solving the above
constraints.
Again, Eq. (5.16) shows that the worst-case attack distribution f∗1...n again takes ex-
ponential form, just like in the case of a single adversary. Following the identical approach
as in the case of Theorem 4.4.2, we prove that φ(d∗, f∗) ≥ φ(d∗, f) for all f ∈ Fη, therefore
proving the left inequality in (4.19). We have now shown that the pair (d∗, f∗), where d∗
is SPRT and f∗(x1, . . . , xn) is the exponential density constitute a saddle point of φ. This
means that the so-called min-max equality holds and we can interchange the order of min






has the same solution with (4.18).
5.4 Experimental Results
We now proceed to experimental evaluation of the analyzed scenario. In order to
correctly capture the behavior of colluding attackers and evaluate the advantage over the
non-colluding strategies, we compare the performance of a single optimal attacker from [26]
with the performance of colluding attackers who generate the optimal back-off sequence
according to the pdf f∗12. The detection schemes employed in [2, 26] use different metrics
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to evaluate the performance of attackers and the detection algorithms. We believe that
the performance of the detection algorithms is better captured by employing the expected
time before detection E[TD] and the average time between false alarms E[TFA] instead of
detection delay E[N ], used in [26], or throughput, used in [2], as the evaluation parameters.
It is important to note that the chosen values of the parameter a in all the experi-
ments are small and vary from 10−2 to 10−10. We claim that this represents an accurate
estimate of the false alarm rates that need to be satisfied in actual anomaly detection
systems [22, 23], a fact that was not taken into account in the evaluation of previously
proposed systems.
The back-off distribution of both optimal single attacker from [26] and optimal
colluding attackers from Eq. (5.8) was implemented in the network simulator Opnet and
tests were performed for various levels of false alarms and various values of the parameter
η. The sequence of optimal back-off values was then exported to Matlab and the quickest
detection tests were performed on the given sets of data.
We first analyze the effectiveness of the quickest detection scheme against colluding
attackers with different levels of aggressiveness (different values of η). We chose 3 different
values of η: 0.3, 0.6 and 0.9, where η=1 represents the scenario where all nodes follow
the rules of the protocol. The results of the above strategies are presented in Fig. 5.2. As
expected, the detection delay increases with η and is almost identical for higher values
of η. This re-confirms the effectiveness of the optimal SPRT-based detection scheme
for detection of nodes that significantly deviate from the protocol rules. However, it is
important to quantify the advantage of the colluding scheme over a single attacker in order
to justify employment of an additional attacker. It is to be expected that the colluding
nodes will experience larger detection delays, depending on the η they choose for their
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Figure 5.2: Tradeoff curves for 2 colluding nodes and η = 0.3, 0.6 and 0.9.
access strategy. Fig. 5.3 compares the performance of colluding and single attackers for
η=0.6. It is important to mention that the crucial advantage of colluding nodes is that
















Tradeoff curves for η = 0.6
No collusion
Colluding
Figure 5.3: Tradeoff curves for η = 0.6: detection times for colluding nodes are up to 2
times longer than for a single node with identical strategy.
59
the detection system is not aware of collaboration among the attackers and performs
detection on a single malicious node. As expected, the detection delay for colluding nodes
is approximately 2 times higher than for a single attacker. In order to illustrate the effect of
η on the detection delay, we now perform the same test with η=0.9. As it can be seen from
Fig. 5.4, the detection delay for colluding nodes increases even further as the aggressiveness
of the attackers decreases. Finally, we fix η=0.9 for the case of a single attacker and













Tradeoff curves for η = 0.9
No collusion
Colluding
Figure 5.4: Tradeoff curves for η = 0.9: detection times for colluding nodes are up to 3
times longer than for a single node with identical strategy.
attempt to find the corresponding value of η for the case of colluding nodes that will have
the same detection delay. As it can be seen from Fig. 5.5, the corresponding value of η is
approximately 0.4, which represents a significant gain (recall that η=0 represents the DoS
attack) and enables colluding attackers to significantly deviate from the protocol rules with
the detection delay equivalent to the one when there is almost no misbehavior. Finally,
it is important to address the issue of overhead of the proposed detection algorithm. The
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Figure 5.5: Tradeoff curves for η = 0.9 (single attacker) and η = 0.4 (colluding attackers).
SPRT is highly efficient since no observation vectors need to be stored. The only storage
complexity is the one needed for the pdfs f1 and f0, the thresholds “a” and “b” and the
current statistic Sn. In addition to that, the SPRT algorithm is also time-efficient, since
in order to compute the log-likelihood we only need to compute the ratio of two functions
(f0 and f1, which are very simple to evaluate) and add this value to the current statistic
Sn. Therefore, the overhead of the proposed algorithm is low and can be obtained by
adding the two previously mentioned values.
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Chapter 6
Impact of interference on the performance of optimal detection schemes
6.1 Overview
In Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3 we briefly introduced the importance of considering impact of
interference on the performance of detection schemes. Before proceeding to analytical
evaluation, we analyze the behavior of optimal detection scheme presented in Chap. 4 in
the presence of interference. We assume that (i) the main source of interference are con-
current transmissions of neighboring nodes, (ii) the effects of interference are observed in
terms of reduced Signal-to-Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) and (iii) reduction in SINR
results in missed observations (RTS or CTS packets) at the observers side. Depending
Figure 6.1: Average detection delay for different values of SINR and n=1, 3, 10
on interference conditions, a percentage of the back-off samples collected by the observer
nodes are corrupted (not measured correctly). In that case, the most convenient mea-
sure of performance is the Packet Error Rate (PER) of RTS/CTS messages. In this case,
PER indicates the amount of additional measurements required for reaching a decision,
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depending on whether the observer node resides within range of the attacker (RTS ob-
servations) or the receiver (CTS observations) of the attack. Fig. 6.1 shows the average
required number of samples needed for detection of an optimal attacker for different in-
tensity of interference, with respect to the absolute gain ηn+1 . System performance is
evaluated for n = 1, 3 and 10. For large values of Pd it can be observed that intense
interference conditions (reflected in the SINR values of 3-4 dB) can increase the number
of required samples by 85%− 120% compared to the case when no interference is present.
It is also worth mentioning that as the aggressiveness of an attacker increases, the number
of samples needed for detection decreases, regardless of the SINR values. However, in real
IDSs, the PFA needs to be much lower than the one used in most theoretical analysis in
current literature [23, 22]. As a consequence, the detection delay in the presence of in-
tense interference is still significantly higher than in conditions without interference, even
for more aggressive attacks. This will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter.
Finally, we observe that for SINR> 8dB, the performance of the detection scheme is not
affected significantly by interference due to the fact that most RTS/CTS messages are
received correctly. Hence, interference can be viewed as an aid to the adversary in the
sense that it provides him additional benefit by prolonging detection. Consequently, this
leads to raising the cost of detection. Due to different lengths of RTS and CTS messages,
the number of samples needed to detect misbehavior is lower when CTS messages are
used in measurements. For example, for SINR values of 3-4 dB, α = β = 0.01, we observe
an increase of 85 − 100% in the number of required samples compared to that with no
interference. Therefore, when assigning observer roles to nodes, emphasis should be given
to those nodes that are located within range of the receiver. The amount of additional
measurements needed for detection expressed in the form of PER for different values of
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SINR is presented in Fig. 6.2.
Figure 6.2: PER[%] as a function of SINR for RTS and CTS messages
It can be observed from Fig. 6.1 and Fig. 6.2 that as a result of interference the
observer may not hear RTS or CTS messages, which results in a corrupted observation
sequence and detection delay. Given the fact that timely detection of attacks is of crucial
importance in wireless environments, this represents a significant obstacle. In the remain-
der of this section we will perform detailed analysis of possible interference scenarios and
their impact on the performance of detection schemes. We will analyze the worst-case
performance of the detection scheme and establish performance bounds.
6.2 Problem setup
Before proceeding towards a formal analysis of the interference problem at the ob-
servers side, we first address the issue at the attackers side. In this work we assume that
the goal of the attacker is to deny medium access to legitimate protocol participants. The
attacker achieves this by adopting strategies that give him higher access probability and
consequently increase his own gain. In the presence of interference we assume the attacker
attempts to access the medium with the same strategy that was presented in Chap. 4.
However, due to low SINR, it may miss CTS message from the receiver and not send any
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data. We now note that, although the adversary does not gain access to the medium, in
this case the main goal is achieved: (i) the adversary transmits RTS message and silences
his neighborhood for the duration of the potential data transmission and (ii) the receiver
sends CTS message which silences his own neighborhood, just as if the whole exchange
of data were successful. Hence, the adversary, whose goal is to deny access to legitimate
participants, still achieves his goal in the presence of interference and need not change
his own strategy. On the other hand, the presence of errors at the detector’s side will
result in delayed detection and needs to be considered. In this scenario, we assume that
the detector experiences interference and fails to detect a new control message sent by an
attacker with probability p2. As a consequence, the detector will no longer observe the
original attacker’s strategy f?1 (x). Instead, it will observe the new back-off distribution,
f̃?1 (x) which is generated according to the following set of rules:
1. The real back-off x1 is observed with probability 1− p2;
2. back-off x1 + x2 is observed with probability p2(1 − p2) (one transmission of the
attacker is not observed);
3. back-off x1 + x2 + x3 is observed with probability p22(1− p2) (2 transmissions of the
attacker are not observed);
4. . . .
5. back-off x1 + . . . + xi is observed with probability pi−12 (1− p2) (i-1 transmissions of
the attacker are not observed);
where each back-off xi is generated according to the original pdf f?1 (x) given by the
Eq. (4.21). For example, the new pdf generated by missing one transmission, can be cal-
culated as P (X1+X2 ≤ Y ), which is nothing else but convolution of f?1 (x)∗f?1 (x). In order
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Figure 6.3: Noise diagram.
to illustrate this, we present a simple scenario in Fig. 6.3. We assume the malicious node
M attempts to access the channel using the optimal pdf f?1 (x), generating corresponding
back-off values bi. When no interference is present, an observer (detector) that is mea-
suring back-off values of neighboring stations measures time periods between successive
RTS messages, Ti and calculates the corresponding back-off values bi (an example of such
calculation is provided in Chap. 3 or in [27]). However, if the observer misses the second
control message, it measures back-off b1 + b2 a time instance t2 instead of registering two
successive back-off values b1 and b2 at time instances t1 and t2 respectively. Depending on
the duration of interference, the observer retrieves a corrupted back-off sequence, which
results in detection delay.
6.2.1 Derivation of the worst-case attack in the presence of interference
In this section we derive an expression for the worst-case attack in the presence
of interference following the framework from Chap. 4 and evaluate the performance loss
of the detector in such scenarios. We assume that the adversary generates the back-off
sequence using an optimal pdf f?1 (x). As a consequence of interference, the detector ob-
serves a different back-off sequence and a different pdf of both the adversary and legitimate
participant: f̃?1 (x) and f̃0(x) respectively. Following the approach from Chap. 4, the de-





dx. However, f̃0(x) is no longer
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uniform and now the problem of finding the attack that maximizes the required number








subject to the constraints,
∫
xf?1 (x)dx ≤ η and
∫
xf?1 (x) dx = 1 (6.2)
where η has the same meaning as in Chap. 4. We now observe that the constraints from
Eq. (6.2) are with respect to f?1 (x) and the original expression in Eq. (6.1) that needs to
be minimized is with respect to f̃?1 (x). In order to derive an expression for the optimal
pdf we first prove the following claim:
Claim 6.2.1. Imposing constraints on f?1 (x) is equivalent to imposing constraints on
f̃?1 (x), i.e. there exists a linear relation between the constraints with a known factor.
Proof. Assuming that the probability of missing a control message sent by an attacker is
p2, the expression for f̃?1 (x) can be expressed as:
f̃?1 (x) = (1− p2)f?1 (x) + p2(1− p2)f?1 ∗ f?1 (x) + p22(1− p2)f?1 ∗ f?1 ∗ f?1 (x) + . . . (6.3)
where “*” denotes convolution. Applying the Laplace transform to the Eq.(6.3) yields:
F̃ ?1 (s) = (1− p2)F ?1 (s) + p2(1− p2)(F ?1 )2(s) + p22(1− p2)(F ?1 )3(s) + . . . (6.4)
After applying the well known properties of the Laplace transform: F(0)=1 and ∂F (s)∂s |s=0=−
∫
xf(x)dx
to the Eq. (6.4), the following expression is obtained:
∂F̃ ?1 (s)
∂s |s=0




By using ∂F (s)∂s |s=0=−
∫
xf(x) dx it is now easy to derive from Eq.(6.5) that
∫






which concludes the proof.
We now transfer the constraints from f?1 (x) to f̃
?









xf̃?1 (x) dx + µ
∫
f̃?1 (x) dx (6.6)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to equality constraints and λ is the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) multiplier corresponding to the inequality constraint. The




2. λ ≥ 0
3. λ(
∫
xf̃?1 (x) dx− η) = 0
4.
∫
f̃?1 (x) dx = 1
5.
∫
xf̃?1 (x) dx ≤ η
In order to derive a result using the condition (1), we apply the method of variations to
Eq.(6.6). In order to proceed further, we assume that
f̃?ε (x) = (1− ε)f̃?1 (x) + εδ(x)
which corresponds to perturbation around f̃?1 (x). By replacing f̃
?
1 (x) with f̃
?
1ε(x) in
Eq. (6.6), the criterion becomes a function of ε. Consequently, if f̃?1 (x) is optimum, then











+1+λx+µ)dx = 0 (6.7)
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+ 1 + λx + µ = 0
and consequently
f̃?1 (x) = f̃0(x)e
−1−µe−λx (6.8)
By analyzing the second KKT condition, λ ≥ 0, for (i) λ = 0 and (ii) λ > 0, we conclude
that λ > 0 at all times, i.e. all constraints are active. We now observe that f̃?1 (x) from
Eq. (6.8) is of exponential nature only if f̃0(x) is either exponential nature or constant (as




It is now easy to derive the relation between F̃0(s) and F0(s) from Eq.(6.3):
F̃0(s) = (1− p2)F0(s)(1 + p2F0(s) + p22F 20 (s) + . . .) =
(1− p2)F0(s)
1− p2F0(s) (6.9)
Obviously, f̃0(x) is neither constant nor exponential, which results in f̃1
?
(x) not being
of exponential nature any more. Consequently, the analysis from the previous chapters
is no longer valid. Although the adversary still accesses the channel using the pdf f?1 (x)
(and denies channel access to the legitimate participants for the same amount of time)and
the legitimate participants access the channel using the uniform pdf f0(x), the detector
observes different access distributions for both the adversary and legitimate participants,
which results in different detection delay. We now propose a framework for establishing
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Figure 6.4: Markov Chain representation of the system. Each state corresponds to a
different SINR level.
6.3 FSM for SINR variation
As it has previously been pointed out, the detector will miss an observation with
certain probability, which consequently results in erroneous back-off observations. In this
analysis we adopt the approach from [28] and apply it to the case of the IEEE 802.11
noisy environment.
6.3.1 System model
Let S = s1, s2, . . . , sK denote the state space of a Markov chain with K states.
Each of the observed K states corresponds to a certain SINR level. We assume that
each SINR level results in a corresponding observation error at the detector’s side. More
specifically, we assume that SINRi results in observing back-off x̃i = x1 + . . .+xi instead
of observing separate back-off values x1, x2, . . . , xi. Consequently, we assume that the
detector observes an erroneous back-off generation pdf in each state i 6= 1, equal to
f̃?i (x) = f
?
1 (x) ∗ . . . ∗ f?1 (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
, where “*” denotes convolution. A system is said to be in
the state si if the corresponding SINR values are in the range [Γk, Γk+1). Consequently,
the system can be characterized with the following set of thresholds: ~Γ = [Γ1, . . . , ΓK+1].
Furthermore, let Pij and πi represent the state transition probability and the steady state
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probability respectively. We assume the transitions happen between the adjacent states,
resulting in Pk,i = 0 for |k − i| > 1. The actual values of the thresholds and transition
probabilities can be obtained by simulation (i.e. in [28]) and the analysis of methods used
for such performance evaluation is beyond scope of this thesis.
6.3.2 Performance analysis
In order to evaluate the performance of the IDS in the presence of interference we first
return to Fig. 6.4. It has already been mentioned that in each state of the Markov chain the
detector observes a different back-off sequence, i.e. in state i, the observed back-off will be
x1+. . .+xi and the detector will register a single (large) back-off value instead of registering
i separate (small) back-off values. We now observe the worst-case scenario, when i →∞.
Since x1, x2, . . . is a sequence of random variables which are defined on the same probability
space, they share the same probability distribution and are independent, the distribution
of their sum Si = x1 + . . . + xi approaches the normal distribution N (iµ, σ2i). Hence,
for K (from Fig. 6.4) sufficiently large, the distance between the observed distributions
becomes the distance between N (Kµ1, σ21K) and N (Kµ0, σ20K), where µi, σi, i = 0, 1
represent the mean and variance of legitimate and adversarial distributions.
Due to the fact that the detection delay E[N ] is inversely proportional to the KL-
distance between the original and adversarial distributions, the only fact we are interested
in at this point is how this distance changes as the interference level increases. For this
analysis we again return to the Markov chain in Fig. 6.4. We now observe states i and
i + 1 of the Markov chain. We observe that the corresponding distributions in states i
and i + 1 are f̃?i , f̃0i and f̃
?
i+1, f̃0(i+1) respectively. Using the proof from [29] we form the
following Lemma:
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Figure 6.5: Performance comparison of the detection scheme with and without interference
for ηn+1 = 0.8.
Lemma 6.3.1. If the distributions at states i and i + 1 of the Markov chain are f̃?i , f̃0i
and f̃?i+1, f̃0(i+1) respectively, then D(f̃
?
i ||f̃0i) > D(f̃?i+1||f̃0(i+1)) for all i ≥ 1.
The above lemma states that the KL-distance between the original and the adver-
sarial distributions decreases as i increases. Knowing that i increases with the increase
of interference level (or decrease in the SINR level), we conclude that the KL-distance
between the observed distributions decreases with the increase of interference. Since the
detection delay E[N ] is inversely proportional to the KL-distance, it is easy to see that
the detection delay increases with the increase of interference level in the system. This
result was expected even by intuitive analysis, since the detector observes larger back-off
sequences than the actual ones, which logically leads to delay in detection (i.e. the detec-
tor believes that the adversary is accessing the channel using legitimate back-off function).
In order to illustrate the impact of interference on the performance of a detection scheme,
we simulate the interference scenario where the detector observes back-off x1 + x2 instead
of two separate back-off values for the value of absolute gain ηn+1 = 0.8. The results are
presented in Fig. 6.5. We can see that even low interference level has significant impact
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on the performance of the detector and the detection delay increases up to 50%.
We now quantify the impact of interference at the performance of the IDS in terms
of PD and PFA. It is known from [25] that PD decreases as the distance between the
observed distribution decreases.As a consequence of this change, the operating point of
the detection system shifts from (PFA1 , PD1) to (PFA2 , PD2), where PD1 > PD2 and PFA1 >
PFA2 . Consequently, with the increase in interference levels will force the IDS towards the
operating point (PFAk , PDk)=(0,0). The interpretation of this result is that the features
of the deployed IDS are not good enough for the environment and that either more IDSs
need to be deployed or another, more robust, IDS needs to be deployed.
We now observe that the presence of interference can severely affect the detector’s
performance. The solution to this problem is to have multiple detectors with different
sensitivity levels available and depending on the requirements of the IDS and environment
conditions, decide which ones to use. For example, in systems where timely decision
making is of crucial importance, the deployed IDSs need to be more robust to interference
(and thus more expensive [22]) and it is also advisable to deploy multiple detectors in order
to minimize the probability of error in decision making. Finally, as we have seen, it is
important not only to detect a quickest detection system, but the crucial step in designing
a precise and robust IDS is to evaluate the environment in which it will be operating
and be able to provide certain performance guarantees, such as that in environments with
SINR<SINRc, the system will be able to to guarantee detection delay TDi with PFAi , PDi .
If the guarantees do not satisfy the needs of the system, either a more expensive detection
system needs to be purchased or alternative detection methods need to be deployed.
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Chapter 7
Cross-entropy minimization and its applications in intrusion detection
In [26] the problem of quickest detection of an optimal attacker was considered and
the performance was evaluated based on the average detection delay. A specific class
of exponential functions was found to represent the worst case attack scenario. In this
work we present the first step towards building a general procedure for constructing an
optimal attack scenario in the MAC layer under general set of constraints that can be
adapted based on specific requirements of an IDS. To achieve this, we use the principle
of minimum cross-entropy [30] which represents a general method of inference about an
unknown probability density and given new information in the form of constraints on
expected values. More specifically, we use the fact from [31] that given a continuous prior
density and new constraints, there is only one posterior density satisfying these constraints
and can be obtained by minimizing cross-entropy. Using the before mentioned facts, we
show that the general expression for the worst-case optimal attack in the IEEE 802.11
MAC is of exponential nature.
7.1 Analysis of single and multi-stage attacks
The principle of minimum cross-entropy provides a general method of inference
about an unknown probability density qf (x) when there exists a prior estimate and new
information I about qf (x) in the form of constraints on expected values. In this notation
x represents a state of a system that has B possible states, corresponding to possible
back-off choices. In addition to that we introduce the set D of all probability densities
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q(x) on B such that q(x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ B. The principle states that, of all densities that
satisfy the constraints, one should choose the posterior qf (x) with the least cross-entropy






where p(x) is a prior estimate of qf (x) [30]. Furthermore, in [31], the authors show that the
principle of minimal cross-entropy is the uniquely correct method for inductive inference
when new information is given in the form of expected values. More specifically, given
information in the form of constraints on expected values, there is only one distribution
satisfying the constraints that can be chosen by a procedure that satisfies the consistency
axioms. To apply this principle to the problem of MAC layer misbehavior detection we
need to note that the goal of the attacker is to achieve maximal gain over a certain period
of time, while minimizing the probability of detection PD. We assume the existence of
the set of constraints I that describe the effects of the desired attack. Additionally, we
assume that I consists of several overlapping constraint subsets I1 ⊂ I2 . . . ⊂ Ii . . . ⊂ IK ,
where I1 corresponds to the DoS attack and IK corresponds to the normal behavior.
More specifically, we assume that the decrease in the index i corresponds to the increase
in the aggressiveness of the attackers strategy (i.e. by decreasing i we decrease the state
space from which the possible back-off values can be chosen, restricting the attacker to
choose from the set consisting of low back-off values). As the coefficient i increases, the
constraints on the attackers pdf are relaxed and the behavior converges towards normal.
Finally, we revisit the definition of constraint I representing it using the constraint set
notation as I = (qf ∈ I).
It has already been mentioned that qf denotes the attacker’s desired probability
density function. The prior pdf p is an estimate of qf prior to learning the constraints
imposed upon the pdf. In our scenario, p is uniform due to the fact that every legitimate
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participant in the IEEE 802.11 protocol chooses his back-off according to the uniform
pdf. Given the uniform prior p and the new information in the form of constraints on the
expected value,
∫
xf1(x)dx ≤ If (7.2)
where If is the final constraint, the posterior density qf is chosen by minimizing the
cross-entropy H[qf , p] in the constraint set If :
H[qf , p] = min
q′∈If
H[q′, p] (7.3)
The above equation describes the behavior of a non-adaptive intelligent attacker.
Namely, the attacker chooses to diverge from the original uniform pdf to the new pdf f1
in one step. This strategy leads to sudden changes in the wireless medium and sudden
decrease in throughput. It has been shown in [27] that the above set of constraints leads
to the attack strategy that is detected after observing N back-off samples, assuming that
the IDS relies solely on the detection based on the number of back-off samples counted
in the given time interval. However, if this detection strategy is combined with any
change detection mechanism that aims to detect sudden changes in the number of dropped
packets (such as watchdog [8]) or throughput, the existence of the attacker can be detected
much earlier. We instead propose an adaptive intelligent strategy that converges from the
original uniform pdf towards the desired qf in k steps, where k is chosen according to the
attacker’s strategy.
The first one involves aggressive approach, where the attacker diverges from the
uniform pdf by choosing a subclass of pdf’s with small back-off values, resulting in the
final pdf qf (x). Alternatively, the attacker may choose to converge towards the desired
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pdf in 2 (or more steps). We now prove that the attacker converges towards the same
final pdf, regardless of the number of steps involved if certain conditions regarding the
constraints are fulfilled.
Proposition 7.1.1. Assume the constraints I1 and I2 are given by I1 = (qf ∈ I1) and
I2 = (qf ∈ I2) for constraint sets I1, I2 ∈ D. If (p ◦ I1) ∈ I2 holds, then qf = p ◦ I1 =
p ◦ (I1 ∧ I2).
In other words, the above proposition states that if the result of taking information
I1 into account already satisfies the constraints imposed by additional information I2, then
taking I2 into account doesn’t change the final outcome. The proof follows the same lines
as the one in [31].
Proof. It is known by the definition that (p ◦ I1) ∈ I1 holds. Additionally, by the assump-
tion (p ◦ I1) ∈ (I1 ∩ I2) holds as well. By using the properties of ◦ operator defined in
[31], the following set of equations can be derived:
p ◦ I1 = (p ◦ I1) ◦ (I1 ∧ I2) = (p ◦ I1) ◦ I2 (7.4)
Finally, using the fact that qf = p ◦ I has the smallest cross-entropy of all densities in I1
and consequently in I1 ∩ I2.
The correspondence to the strategy of an adaptive intelligent attacker is now obvious.
The constraint I1 corresponds to the more aggressive attack strategies that incur larger
gain within a short period of time by choosing small back-off values. This strategy results
in the final pdf qf after taking into consideration the constraint I1. If the attacker first
chooses a milder strategy by choosing constraint I2 that picks back-offs from a larger set of
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values, the final pdf differs from qf and is denoted as pM . By knowing that constraint set
I1 already satisfies the constraints imposed by I2 and applying the previous proposition,
we arrive to the conclusion that regardless of the number of steps applied, the final pdf
of the attacker will always be qf if the constraints applied in the adaptive strategy are
already included by the most aggressive strategy.
7.2 Derivation of the worst-case attack using the principle of minimum cross-
entropy
We now proceed with the description of the attacker. We assume that the attacker
is intelligent: he is aware of the existence of monitoring neighboring nodes and adapts
its access policy in order to avoid detection. In addition to that, the attacker has full
information about the properties of the employed IDS and its optimal detection strategy.
Unlike [26], we assume that the attacker does not choose a single strategy belonging to a
specified class of pdf’s for the whole length of the attack. We assume that the attacker’s
goal is to obtain a long term gain by gradually changing his access policy. The attacker
adapts to the new conditions in the system after the expiration of period ∆t and updates
its pdf given the new set of constraints. Therefore, the goal of the attacker is twofold:
• to diverge from the original pdf step by step by minimizing the distance between
the original and new distribution
• to constantly update his access policy by relaxing the initial constraints
It has been pointed out in [26] that the derived exponential pdf had the minimal
differential entropy (which is equivalent to the case of the maximum entropy when uniform
priors are used) over all pdf’s in the class of functions of interest. We now use the cross-
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entropy principle to show that all optimal attacks have pdf’s that belong to the class of
exponential functions. Depending on the specific environmental parameters, such as PD,
PFA, the aggressiveness of the attack, the attack speed etc. a specific subclass (which is
again of exponential nature) that satisfies the defined constraints is derived.
We now derive the general solution for cross-entropy minimization given arbitrary
constraints and illustrate the result with the specific IEEE 802.11 MAC attack defined
in Chap. 4. The cross-entropy method can be outlined as follows. Given a positive prior
density p and a finite set of constraints:
∫
q(x)dx = 1, (7.5)
∫
fk(x)q(x)dx = f̄k, k = 1, . . . ,m (7.6)







subject to the given set of constraints. By introducing Lagrange multipliers β and λk (k =
1, . . . , m) corresponding to the constraints, the following expression for the Lagrangian is
obtained:




















+ 1 + β +
m∑
k=1
λkfk(x) = 0. (7.8)









with λ0 = β + 1. The cross-entropy at the minimum can be expressed in terms of the λk
and fk as




It is necessary to choose λ0 and λk so that all the constraints are satisfied. In the presence
of the constraint (7.5) we can rewrite the remaining constraints in the form
∫
(fk(x)− f̄k)q(x)dx = 0 (7.11)





λkfk(x))dx = 0 (7.12)















λ0 = f̄k (7.14)
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By finding all the parameters from the given set of constraints, the attacker derives the
new optimal pdf, q(x), that minimizes cross-entropy. Due to the fact that the attacker
aims to achieve a certain gain over a long period of time, we assume that the attacker
will modify his access policy by using q(x) until new information about the system is
collected. At that point the attacker again applies the procedure outlined in Eq. (7.5)-
(7.14) and calculates the new pdf, q1(x), diverging from the original uniform distribution
even further.
7.3 Optimal Attack Scenario in the MAC Layer Using the Cross-entropy Method
We now apply the results from Sect. 7.2 to the specific case of an attack in the
IEEE 802.11 MAC. Due to the fact that every node in the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol
is assumed to back-off uniformly, the attacker’s initial pdf p(x) is assumed to be uniform
over the interval [0,W ]. The attacker wants to adapt to the conditions of the wireless
environment by diverging from p(x) and choosing the new pdf q(x). In general, we claim
that the posterior distribution q can be expressed as a function of the prior distribution
and the newly obtained information q = p ◦ I, where I stands for the known constraints
on expected values and ◦ is an ”information operator” [31].
Using the results of the attack analysis from [27] the following set of constraints is
obtained for the attacker’s posterior pdf q(x):
∫ W
0







xq(x) dx ≤ C1
}
, (7.16)
where C1 = f(η, n). Constraint (7.15) is due to the properties of a pdf and the constraint
(7.16) was obtained in [27] by bounding the long-term probability of channel access in
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the scenario with one malicious node and n legal nodes. The above class Fη includes
all possible attacks for which the incurred relative gain exceeds the legitimate one by
(η − 1) × 100%. The class Fη is the uncertainty class of the robust approach and η is a
tunable parameter. Using the derivations from Sect. 7.2 and a uniform prior, the following
expression for the optimal pdf q(x) is derived:
q(x) =
λ1
W (eλ1 − 1)e
λ1(1− xW ), (7.17)
where the parameter λ0 has been expressed as a function of λ1. The parameter λ1 is a









n + 1− η
nη
(7.18)
After the period of ∆t the attacker takes into account new conditions in the form




Cross-layer impact of optimal attacks
Under regular conditions the MAC layer has to go through multiple transmissions
before detecting a link failure. The detection delay induced by additional congestion due
to the presence of one or more attackers causes the feedback delay to the routing layer. We
now prove that an intelligent attacker acting under the optimal strategy described with
the pdf f?1 (x) derived in Chap. 4 can cause devastating effects in the network layer if no
MAC layer-based IDS is employed. Furthermore, we show that by employing a quickest
detection scheme proposed in Chap. 4, the effects of such attacks can be easily prevented
by isolating the detected attacker at the origin of the attack. Finally, we propose a cross-
layer based cooperation scheme that is mainly oriented towards preventing propagation of
local effects of MAC layer attacks.
We start our analysis by observing the scenario presented in Fig. 8.1 where selfish
node accesses the channel by using an optimal attack strategy. When the back-off counter
decreases to zero, the selfish node sends an RTS to node Int2, which replies with CTS. The
RTS message silences Node2 which is in the wireless range of the selfish node. Source1
and Node1 are out of the range of both sender and receiver. Under the assumption that
Source1 establishes a route to Destination1 through Node1 and Node2, it is reasonable
to assume that Node1 will attempt to transmit to Node2 during the transmission period
of selfish node (we assume that all nodes are backlogged and always have traffic to send).
Node2 is silenced by selfish node’s RTS and is not able to reply with a CTS. After a time
period equal to CTS timeout, Node1 increases its contention window exponentially and
83
attempts to retransmit upon its expiration. We assume that Node1 constantly attempts
to communicate with silenced nodes and consequently increases its contention window
until it reaches its maximal value. At the same time, Source1 sends its regular traffic to
Node1, increasing its backlog over time. As the misbehavior coefficient of the selfish node
increases (or equivalently its back-off decreases), the selfish node gains larger percentage
of channel access. Consequently, Node2 is silenced more frequently, increasing the backlog
at Node1.
Assuming that each node has a finite buffer of size ν, we now derive a general
expression for expected time to buffer overflow at Node1. Furthermore, by analyzing the
scenario in Fig. 8.1 we simplify the general expression, deriving an expression applicable
for analysis of effects of an optimal attack. We show by analysis an simulation that if no
ID mechanism is employed in the MAC layer, the optimal MAC attack forces legitimate
nodes to drop significant number of packets due to buffer overflow. If a watchdog-based or
a more sophisticated reputation-based detection scheme is employed in the network layer,
one or more legitimate nodes can easily be flagged as malicious due to the large number
of dropped packets.
Finally, we analyze the scenario presented in Fig. 8.2 and present the effects of an
optimal MAC layer attack on routes that are out of the wireless range of the attacker.
We show that an intelligent attacker can easily cause route failure by attacking nodes
that belong to the routes with the highest capacity. The results are presented for two
routing protocols: Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) [32] and Ad hoc On Demand







Figure 8.1: Node2 is silenced by the transmission of the selfish node. Consequently, Node1








Figure 8.2: An ongoing attack in the MAC layer breaks the original route, re-routing the
traffic through Node3.
8.1 Impact of MAC Layer Misbehavior on the Network Layer: Time to Buffer
Overflow
As it has been mentioned, the secondary effect of an optimal MAC layer attack
can be as devastating as the primary ones with respect to the network connectivity. If
no alternative route can be found, a non-DoS optimal MAC layer attack can produce a
DoS-like effects in the network layer due to the exponential nature of the IEEE 802.11
DCF back-off algorithm (such as causing buffer overflow in Node1 from Fig. 8.1). This
section provides a comprehensive analysis of the scenario presented in Fig. 8.1, followed
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by analysis of the scenario presented in Fig. 8.2 and simulation results.
We denote the incoming traffic as αt and the outgoing traffic as βt and assume
that both processes are Poisson with parameters α and β respectively. Consequently, δt
represents the difference between the incoming and outgoing traffic: δt = (αt − βt)+ at
time t. Equivalently, δt represents the increase rate of packets in the buffer over time or
backlog. In this setup we are interested in finding the time of buffer overflow
T = inf
t
{δt ≥ ν} (8.1)
where ν denotes the buffer size. Clearly T is random, in fact it is a stopping time. Next
we are going to develop closed form expressions for the average-time-to-overflow, that is,
E[T ].
If U1 < U2 < U3 < . . . represent the arrival times and V1 < V2 < V3 < . . . the
departure times, a typical form of the paths of δt is depicted in Fig. 8.3. We observe that
Figure 8.3: Arrival and departure times in the queue of length δ
δt exhibits piecewise constant paths with discontinuities of size equal to ±1. Without loss
of generality we are going to assume that these paths are right continuous. In order to be
able to compute E[T ] we need to study the paths of the process g(δt) where g(·) denotes
a continuous nonlinear function. If t ≤ T is any time instant before overflow, using the









where Un-, Vn- denote the time instant right before the n-th arrival and departure respec-
tively. Since the discontinuities of δt are equal to ±1 (depending on whether we have
arrival or departure), we can write




with the latter positive part needed because we have a departure only when the buffer is












Replacing in the latter expression t = T and applying expectation we have
E[g(δT )]− g(δ0) = E
[∫ T
0











Because T is a stopping time and δs- is in the past of the time instant s, according to
[34], in the previous two expectations we can replace dαt with αdt and dβt with βdt where
α, β, recall, are the corresponding rates of the two Poisson processes αt, βt. This leads to
the following equation














Notice now that if we select g(·) to satisfy the difference equation
α[g(δ + 1)− g(δ)] + β[g ((δ − 1)+)− g(δ)] = −1 (8.4)
87
then Eqn. (8.3) simplifies to
g(δ0)− E[g(δT )] = E[T ]. (8.5)
Since δt ≥ 0 the function g(·) needs to be defined only for non-negative arguments. How-
ever, in order to avoid using the positive part in (8.4), we can extend g(·) to negative
arguments as follows
g(δ) = g(0), for − 1 ≤ δ ≤ 0, (8.6)
and this simplifies (8.4) to
α[g(δ + 1)− g(δ)] + β[g(δ − 1)− g(δ)] = −1. (8.7)
Furthermore, since at the time of stopping T we have a full buffer, that is, δT = ν (with
ν denoting the buffer size), if we impose the additional constraint
g(ν) = 0, (8.8)
and recall that δ0 = 0, from (8.5) we obtain E[T ] = g(0).
Summarizing, we have E[T ] = g(0) where g(·) is a function that satisfies the differ-
ence equation (8.7) and the two boundary conditions (8.6), (8.8). Since ν is an integer it
suffices to solve (8.7) for integer values of δ meaning that (8.7) can be seen as a recurrence











ν − 1] + ν1−ρ
}







for α = β,
(8.9)
where ρ = β/α denotes the ratio between the outgoing and incoming traffic rates. In
order to examine the effects of various levels of traffic on the network stability needs to
be examined. By definition, stability of the network means bounded backlogs over time,
i.e. supE[δi(t)] < ∞ for all nodes i in the network. We observe that whenever α > β
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(or ρ < 1) the exponential term (for large buffer size ν) is negligible as compared to the
linear term and the queue needs, in the average, linear time to overflow (instability). In
the opposite case α < β (or ρ > 1), the exponential term prevails and the average-time-to-
overflow becomes exponential (stability). These observations can also be seen in Fig. 8.4
for ρ = β/α = 3/2 and ρ = β/α = 2/3 where we plot the average time as a function of
the buffer size ν. Equivalently, α > β implies increase of backlog in the given node over a
period of time and vice versa.
Figure 8.4: Average Time to buffer overflow for ρ = β/α = 3/2 (stability) and ρ = β/α =
2/3 (instability), as a function of the buffer size ν.


























Figure 8.5: Average time to buffer overflow as a function of the traffic rate ratio ρ = β/α
and buffer size ν = 100.
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In the stable case, we observe the extremely large average time required to overflow
even for small values of the buffer size. In Fig. 8.5 we plot the average time as a function
of the traffic rate ratio ρ = β/α, assuming normalized incoming rate α = 1 and buffer size
ν = 100. For any other value of α, according to (8.9), we simply need to divide by α.
We now return to the analysis of the scenario presented in Fig. 8.1. It has already
been mentioned that with the increase of the aggressiveness of the attacker (i. e. param-
eter η in Eq. 4.15), the percentage of channel access for Node2 will accordingly decrease.
Meanwhile, Source1 keeps generating traffic at the same rate, sending packets to Node1.
With Node2 being silenced, Node1 has the parameter β equal to zero. Eq. 8.9 also sug-
gests that whenever α À β (or ρ ¿ 1) then E[T ] ≈ να . In order to proceed further with
the discussion we need to note that finding the average time to buffer overflow E[T ] is
equivalent to finding the average time until the observed node starts losing traffic due
to buffer overflow. We need to note that the scenario in which α À β represents the
secondary effects of an optimal attack. We assume that the network has an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) implemented and that it detects a network layer attack with an
average delay of ∆t. Assuming that the buffer overflow happens at time t, the attack is
detected at time t1 = t + ∆t. Consequently, the amount of traffic lost (TL) due to buffer










It can be easily observed from this expression that even small detection delays of the order
of a couple of seconds have relatively large traffic loss as a consequence.
To illustrate the amount of lost traffic due to detection delay in the network layer
we present the results of the above analysis for a single node in Fig. 8.6 for various rates of
incoming traffic. As expected, the amount of lost traffic increases as the incoming traffic
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rate increases. It can be easily observed that even small detection delays of the order of
a couple of seconds have relatively large traffic loss as a consequence.



















Figure 8.6: The amount of lost traffic as a function of detection delay for fixed buffer size
ν=100.
8.2 Numerical Results
8.2.1 Cross-layer effects of the optimal MAC layer attacks
In order to illustrate the effects of an optimal MAC layer attack on the network layer
we analyze the two scenarios presented in Fig. 8.1 and Fig. 8.2 with DSR and AODV as
routing protocols. Before proceeding with the analysis, a short description of the routing
protocols used in the experiments is provided.
DSR is a source routing protocol: the source knows the complete hop-by-hop route to
the destination and routes are stored in node caches. It consists of two basic mechanisms:
Route Discovery and Route Maintenance. When a node attempts to send a data packet
to a new destination, the source node initiates a route discovery process to dynamically
determine the route. Route Discovery works by flooding Route Request (RREQ) packets.
RREQ packets propagate throughout the network until they are received by a node with a
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route to the destination in its cache or by the destination itself. Such a node replies to the
RREQ with a route reply (RREP) that is routed back to the original source. The RREQ
builds up the path traversed until that moment by recording the intermediate nodes and
the RREP routes itself back to the source by traversing the path backwards. If any link
along a path breaks, Route Maintenance mechanism is invoked by using a Route Error
(RERR) packet, resulting in removal of any route that contains that link. If the route is
still needed by the source, a new route discovery process is issued.
AODV uses table-driven hop-by-hop routing. It applies a similar Route Discovery
process as DSR. However, instead of using route caches, it uses routing tables to store
routing information, one entry per destination. AODV relies on routing table entries
to propagate a RREP back to the source and to route data packets to the destination.
Furthermore, AODV uses sequence numbers (carried by all packets) to determine freshness
of routing information and to prevent routing loops. One notable feature of AODV is the
use of timers regarding utilization of routing table entries. Namely, a routing entry in the
table may expire if it is not used recently. Moreover, a set of neighboring nodes that use
this entry is also maintained; these nodes are notified through RERR packets when the
next hop link breaks. This process is recursively repeated by each node, thereby effectively
deleting all routes using the broken link. Upon that, a new Route Discovery process is
initialized.
We now evaluate the cross-layer impact of the optimal attacker in the MAC layer.
The results of the simulations are presented in Fig. 8.7 and Fig. 8.8. Fig. 8.7 analyzes the
performance of Node1 from Fig. 8.1 as a function of ε with DSR and AODV as the routing
protocols for two cases (i) without MAC layer-based IDS and (ii) with the MAC layer-
based IDS. It is reasonable to expect that Node2 is denied channel access more frequently
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Figure 8.7: Increase in dropped traffic at Node1.
as the aggressiveness of the selfish node increases in the absence of a MAC layer-based IDS.
Consequently, Node1 is disabled from forwarding packets towards the destination. After
evaluating the scenario from Fig. 8.1, we note that the percentage of dropped packets at
Node1 increases with with the aggressiveness of the attacker, since Node2 is denied access
to the channel due to transmissions of the selfish node. We observe that the percentage
increase in dropped traffic is almost linear until ε=0.6. However, further increase in
aggressiveness of the attacker does not bring any significant benefit in terms of increase of
dropped traffic at legitimate nodes. This effect is due to the operating mechanism of the
DSR protocol. Namely, if the neighboring node (in this case Node2) does not respond to
the requests of the sender for a certain period of time, the route maintenance mechanism of
DSR protocol sends a RERR and a new RREQ is issued. Consequently, the contents of the
buffer are flushed after the issue of RERR. Therefore, the maximum value of percentage
increase in dropped traffic due to the malicious behavior in the MAC layer is bounded
by (i) size of the maintenance buffer in the observed node and (ii) the route maintenance
timeout value (which in this case corresponds to 40% increase in dropped traffic, even
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Figure 8.8: Percentage increase in traffic through alternate route as a consequence of an
ongoing MAC layer attack.
in the case of the DoS attack). Another interesting observation is that the number of
dropped packet decreases for the maximal value of the misbehavior coefficient. This can
be easily explained by the fact that Source1 cannot establish a route to Destination1
when a DoS attack is launched. Consequently, very few packets are sent to Node1, most
of which are dropped due to unavailability of the neighboring node. AODV, on the other
hand, exhibited high resistance to misbehavior with the percentage of dropped packets
being close to zero and almost independent of the degree of misbehavior. The difference
in performance of two protocols can be explained as follows. If a node that belongs to
a DSR route detects a broken link, it tries to salvage packets waiting in send buffer by
trying to search for an alternative route in the route cache. Once this process fails, the
packets in the buffer are dropped and a RERR is sent to the source. AODV, on the other
hand, has no route cache, but instead uses local repair when a broken link is detected.
Namely, if a node detects a broken link, it sends RREQ directly to the destination. This
implies that misuses that are targeted at disrupting services can generate only temporary
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impact, forcing the attacker to repeat misuses at higher frequency in order to disrupt the
service. Observing the results in Fig. 8.7, we conclude that the local repair mechanism of
AODV protocol can handle failures due to MAC layer attacks with much higher success
rate than DSR.
To further illustrate the effects of an optimal MAC layer attack on the network layer
we now proceed to the analysis of the scenario presented in Fig. 8.2. An additional traffic
generating source (Source2) and an additional node (Node3) that resides in the wireless
range of Node1 are added. These additional nodes enable creation of an alternative route
to Destination1 in case of failure of Node2. We repeat the same misbehavior pattern
of the selfish node as in the previous scenario and record the traffic increase through
an alternative route. Due to the failure of Node2 and the exponential nature of back-
off mechanism of Node1, Node2 becomes unreachable after the certain threshold (that
corresponds to ε = 0.4) and traffic is re-routed to the final destination through Node3.
This topology ensures better throughput for legitimate nodes and decreases the total
number of dropped packets for the DSR protocol due to the fact that after the initial
route is broken, an alternative route from its cache is used to send packets. AODV, due
to the identical reasons as in the previous example, is again superior to DSR with respect
to the number of packets dropped and does not use the alternative route.
8.2.2 Implementation of an optimal MAC layer-based IDS
The experimental results of the scenario that employs an optimal MAC layer attack
were presented in Sect. 8.2.1 and illustrated its effects in terms of lost traffic. In order to
prevent (i) vertical propagation of attacks and (ii) false accusations of legitimate nodes we
















Figure 8.9: Proposed cross-layer collaboration
modules. Module 1, residing in the MAC layer employs the SPRT-based detection strategy
described in Chap. 4. The advantage of having the MAC layer module is two-fold. First of
all, we avoid the trap of false accusations in the MAC layer due to collisions and constant
retransmissions. Secondly, as we will see in the remainder of the section, it reduces the
probability of false alarms in the Network Layer as well. Module 2 resides in the Network
Layer and employs already existing detection mechanisms, such as watchdog or any other
suitable algorithm for detection of malicious activities. The major problem with Network
Layer-based detection algorithms is that they rely on observing the number of dropped
packets as the main source of information and base their decisions on misbehavior on
that information. However, a node may drop significant amount of packets due to either
poor channel conditions (i.e. interference) or network congestion, which may lead to
false accusations. In order to prevent this scenario, we establish vertical communication
among the detection modules. Both layers send their information to the IDS module.
Module 1 sends the list of misbehaving nodes in the MAC layer and Module 2 sends
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the list of nodes with suspicious behavior (i.e. nodes which are accused by watchdog or
some other mechanism). In addition to that, we assume the IDS has the information
about the network topology, such as interference graphs, existing paths etc. Using the
information obtained from Module 1 and topology information it makes a decision about
misbehavior and broadcasts the decision information throughout the network. In addition
to that, using the topology information it makes a temporary decision about the best
route choices in order to avoid congested areas that were created due to misbehavior.
We now implement the optimal MAC layer-based detection scheme presented in
[26] and investigate the effects on the dropped traffic in the network layer with DSR and
AODV as routing protocols. We assume that all nodes that take part in the detection
process are legitimate and do not falsely accuse their peers of misbehavior. The results
are presented in Fig. 8.7. Observing the results for the DSR protocol performance we
note that the IDS achieves maximum performance for misbehavior coefficients that are
larger than 0.5 (i.e. more aggressive attacks). This can be easily explained by noting that
the MAC layer IDS was constructed to detect a class of more aggressive attacks that have
higher impact on the system performance. On the other hand, the low impact attacks take
longer to be detected and influence the performance of the routing protocol. Namely, low-
impact attacks achieve certain gain in channel access time when compared to legitimate
nodes. This causes temporary congestion in the MAC layer, where legitimate nodes back-
off for larger periods of time due to the exponential nature of back-off mechanism in
IEEE 802.11 DCF. Even after the selfish node is isolated, the legitimate nodes compete
among themselves for channel access, which causes a small increase in dropped traffic.
When the performance of low impact attacks is analyzed, it can be observed that the
congestion effects last for additional 5-10s after the isolation of the attacker. However,
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the IDS detects and isolates aggressive selfish nodes almost instantly, causing no effects in
the network layer. Consequently, the percentage increase in dropped traffic at legitimate
nodes for aggressive strategies of an optimal attacker is equal to zero. We also note that
AODV is more robust to MAC layer attacks from the reasons mentioned in Sect. 8.2.1 and
consequently implementation of a MAC layer-based IDS has no significant influence on its
performance.
We conclude that the effect of MAC layer misbehavior on the network layer is
twofold: (i) legitimate nodes are forced to drop significant number of packets due to
unavailability of their neighbors that are blocked by the selfish node; (ii) consequently,
it causes significant decrease in throughput due to unavailability of one or more nodes
belonging to the initial route. This gives rise to a larger number of false positives generated
by an ID mechanism that resides in the network layer since most of the network-based
ID mechanisms are threshold-based and react only after a certain number of dropped
packets per second is exceeded. Consequently, if no MAC layer ID mechanism is employed,
legitimate nodes can be accused of misbehaving. This proves the necessity of existence of
ID mechanisms in both MAC and network layers.
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